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DAVIS v. DAVIS: AN INCONSISTENT EXCEPTION TO AN
OTHERWISE SOUND RULE ADVANCING
PROCREATIONAL FREEDOM AND REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
Several centuries ago, the thought that a human child could be
produced without sexual contact between a man and woman would
have been considered ludicrous, if not downright heresy. However,
since 1978,1 in vitro fertilization ("IVF") 2 has made such "heresy"
possible and has become widely accepted throughout the industrial-
ized world. With the advent of IVF, traditional concepts such as
parenthood and the status of the unborn have been revolutionized.
The importance of these developments cannot be understated, as
they impact the health of the family and the roles that both men
and women play within the family unit. It is axiomatic that the
family lies at the heart of every society; it has thus been called "es-
sential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."' As a re-
sult, rights associated with the family have been deemed fundamen-
tal by the United States Supreme Court." Consequently, the moral,
societal, and legal developments surrounding IVF and its associated
procedures must be closely monitored.
When confronted with an unprecedented concept such as IVF, a
court has two choices: it can either apply legal principles as they
currently exist, or it can fashion new rules of law to apply to the
novel situation. The question therefore arises whether existing legal
principles are sufficient to handle the social and ethical implications
of IVF, or whether IVF is so innovative that the law must, by neces-
sity, reinvent itself. Moreover, whichever direction a court chooses,
1. See infra note 26 (discussing the first successful in vitro fertilization and the birth of Louise
Brown).
2. See infra notes 20-56 and accompanying text (detailing the IVF procedure).
3. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Matters pertaining to the family have been
deemed "fundamental" by the United States Supreme Court. See infra notes 57-106 and accom-
panying text (discussing Supreme Court cases establishing the fundamental rights of reproduction,
parenting, and the use of birth control).
4. See infra notes 59-69 and accompanying text (discussing the development of privacy rights
as applied to familial matters).
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the issue of how far such constructs can and should reach must be
addressed. If a court considerably alters existing law in order to
shape it to the peculiarities of IVF, it risks accusations of judicial
meddling in the business of the legislature.. And yet, if a court fails
to take any action, fundamental rights guaranteed by the United
States Constitution could be violated.' In addition to these concerns,
the inherent risk in any new approach is that it may prove
unworkable.7
The Tennessee Supreme Court was forced to address these issues
in the case of Davis v. Davis,8 where IVF collided head-on with the
Constitution. The Davis court chose to extend existing constitutional
precedent in order to protect the fundamental rights of IVF partici-
pants. The highly unique fact pattern of the Davis case arose in the
context of a divorce. The divorcing couple, Mary Sue and Junior
Davis, underwent in vitro fertilization procedures during the course
of their marriage with the hope that they could produce their own
biological child. 9 The couple produced nine "preembryos" 10 in all;
two were implanted and seven were cryogenically-preserved, or fro-
zen,"1 for later transfer to Mary Sue's uterus. 2 However, before the
5. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the Supreme Court awarded itself "sovereignty over a field where it has
little proper business since the answers to most of the cruel questions posed are political and not
juridical").
6. For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Supreme Court refused to
extend the right of privacy to protect consensual homosexual conduct in the privacy of a home. Id.
at 189. By failing to extend the right of privacy in this instance, the Court arguably violated the
fundamental "right to be let alone." Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
7. The trimester analysis formulated by Justice Harry Blackmun in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), is an example of a legal innovation that has been repeatedly criticized as "problem-
atic." See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2811 (1992)
(noting that "time has overtaken some of Roe's factual assumptions"); Webster, 492 U.S. at 529
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (referring to Roe's framework as "problematic"); Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstets. and Gynecs., 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(describing Roe's framework as "outdated"); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
462 U.S. 416, 455 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining that because of new medical
technologies, the point of viability is no longer static and therefore the trimester approach is no
longer helpful); see also infra notes 83-98 and accompanying text (explaining the Roe trimester
framework in more detail).
8. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Stowe v. Davis, 113 S. Ct. 1259
(1993).
9. Id. at 589.
10. See infra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the propriety of the term
"preembryo").
11. See infra notes 40-56 and accompanying text (discussing the cryopreservation process).
12. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 592.
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couple could implant the remaining seven preembryos, Junior Davis
filed for divorce.' 3 During the proceedings, Mary Sue asked for
"custody" of the preembryos so that she could implant them and
bring them to term." However, Junior contested Mary Sue's re-
quest because he did not wish to become a parent "outside the
bounds of marriage."' 5 Because a failure to implant the preembryos
would eventually result in their destruction,' 6 the Davises found
themselves embroiled in a "custody" battle over seven four- to eight-
celled frozen entities. The Tennessee Supreme' Court awarded Jun-
ior Davis the preembryos, holding that his right to procreational au-
tonomy included the "right to avoid procreation."'"
This Note analyzes the Davis decision in light of previous consti-
tutional precedent and discusses the opinion's future impact on dis-
putes involving frozen embryos and constitutional rights. It begins
with an overview of in vitro fertilization and cryopreservation. This
Note then surveys the fundamental right to privacy; where, when,
and to whom it applies; and the decisions that have found that the
right to procreate is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' ' 8
Within this context, this Note explores four differing perceptions of
a preembryo's status: the "Right-to-Life" posture, the Supreme
Court's position, the widely-held "Special Respect" view, and the
notion'that preembryos should be considered personal property.
This Note then focuses on the particular facts of the Davis case
and its procedural history, undertaking a detailed analysis of the
Tennessee Supreme Court's opinion. It concludes that the court's
extension of constitutional principles to IVF situations was, for the
most part, sensible. Moreover, it agrees that the Special Respect
view adopted by the court' 9 is the proper mechanism by which to
13. Id.
14. Id. at 589.
15. Id.
16. See infra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the longevity of cryogenically-pre-
served preembryos).
17. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601-04.
18. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). In Palko, the Supreme Court held that
"immunities that are valid as against the federal government by force of the specific pledges of
particular amendments have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. at
324-25. This phrase has been used by the Court to support the rights of privacy and procreation.
See infra notes 57-106 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional rights implicated by
IVF and cryopreservation).
19. The Special Respect view of preembryos posits that because of their moral significance,
preembryos deserve greater respect that mere human tissue, but less respect than that accorded to
a person. See infra notes 122-31 and accompanying text (discussing the Special Respect view in
19941
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judge the legal status of preembryos. And while this Note concludes
that the right of privacy can, as the Davis court held, encompass the
two coexisting rights of procreation and nonprocreation, it disagrees
with the Tennessee Supreme Court's creation of an exception to the
Davis decision which in effect "swallows up" the holding itself.
Finally, this Note analyzes the balancing test the Davis court
used to evaluate the interests of both Mary Sue and Junior Davis. It
concludes by discussing the possible impact of the Davis court's
holding and by advocating the use of prior dispositional agreements
for all participants in IVF programs in order to prevent situations
similar to that experienced by the Davises from happening in the
future.
I. BACKGROUND
A. In Vitro Fertilization and Cryopreservation
Procreation is a fundamental right not only because it ensures the
survival of our species but also because to many, procreation gives
meaning to life. In vitro fertilization developed as a result of this
primary instinct: it is the means by which infertile couples 0 can
produce biologically-related offspring.
A discussion of infertility best evidences the need for IVF. Recent
studies show that 15 percent of all couples of reproductive age expe-
rience some difficulty having children.21 Out of sixty-seven million
reproductively active couples, ten million are, in fact, infertile.22 As
a result, many couples have sought alternative means of reproduc-
tion,23 which have developed and become more socially acceptable in
recent years.24 In vitro fertilization 5 is one such relatively new pro-
more detail).
20. Physicians consider couples infertile if they fail to conceive after one year of unprotected
intercourse. I ROBERT K. AUSMAN & DEAN E. SNYDER, MEDICAL LIBRARY, LAWYERS EDITION
§ 1.32, at 175 (1988).
21. Tamara L. Davis, Comment, Protecting the Cryopreserved Embryo. 57 TENN. L. REV. 507,
510 n.22 (1990).
22. Id.
23. Kathryn V. Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territory for Legislation, 44
LA. L. REV. 1641, 1642 (1984).
24. Such methods include in vitro fertilization as well as artificial insemination, surrogacy, and
embryo transfer. See generally id. at 1643-75 (describing each of the procedures and the legal
treatment they receive).
25. The term "in vitro" refers to conception outside of the mother's body that takes place "in
an artificial environment." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 851 (27th ed. 1988)
[hereinafter DORLAND'S].
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cedure which allows infertile couples to produce biologically-related
offspring. From 197828 to 1985, more than 5,000 children were born
in the United States alone using IVF technology.2 7
While a woman's body produces a single egg during a normal
menstrual cycle,28 in vitro fertilization procedures use hormonal
stimulation of a woman's ovaries to generate multiple eggs.2 9 When
these eggs mature, they are surgically removed, or aspirated,30 in a
procedure called laparoscopy.31 An aspirated egg is nourished in a
culture medium 32 and then placed in a petri dish, where sperm are
26. Louise Brown, the first human child to be conceived using in vitro fertilization, was born in
England on July 25, 1978. Lorio, supra note 23, at 1665. Her parents' account of her birth is
detailed in LESLIE & JOHN BROWN, OUR MIRACLE CALLED LOUISE: A PARENT'S STORY (1979).
The doctors who brought her to life tell their story in ROBERT G. EDWARDS & PATRICK STEPTOE,
A MATTER OF LIFE: THE STORY OF A MEDICAL BREAKTHROUGH (1980).
27. John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV.
437, 440 (1990) [hereinafter Robertson, Legal Status of Early Embryos]. Furthermore, approxi-
mately 15,000 children worldwide have been brought into existence through IVF. Alise R. Pa-
nitch, Note, The Davis Dilemma: How to Prevent Battles Over Frozen Preembryos, 41 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 543, 543 (1991). In 1987, it was estimated that IVF techniques were used an aver-
age of once a day in the United States. Davis, supra note 21, at 511. In 1991, there were approxi-
mately 220 in vitro fertilization clinics in the United States. Panitch, supra, at 545.
28. John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 OHIO ST. L.J.
407, 407 (1990) [hereinafter Robertson, Prior Agreements]. For a detailed discussion of concep-
tion, cell-division, implantation, and the gestational process, see 2 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
MEDICINE 970 (John Walton et al. eds., 1986); Robertson, Legal Status of Early Embryos, supra
note 27, at 441-43.
29. John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of
the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 948 (1986) [hereinafter Robertson, Legal Struc-
ture of New Reproduction]; see also AUSMAN & SNYDER, supra note 20, § 1.32 (d)(3) (listing
some of the chemical compounds administered during in vitro procedures). Stimulating ovum pro-
duction increases a woman's odds of becoming pregnant because, more than one fertilized egg is
eventually transferred to the uterus. Robertson, Legal Structure of New Reproduction, supra, at
948. It is entirely normal for ten or more eggs to be retrieved. Robertson, Prior Agreements. supra
note 28, at 407. As Professor Robertson points out, "While increasing efficacy, the technique also
makes excess embryos and embryo selection possible, and thus is the source of many of the ethical
issues that arise in this area." Robertson, Legal Structure of New Reproduction, supra, at 948
n.24.
30. Aspiration is the "removal of fluids or gases from a cavity by the application of suction."
DORLAND'S, supra note 25, at 156-57.
31. A laparoscope is "a type of endoscope, consisting of an illuminated tube with an optical
system, that is inserted through the abdominal wall for examining the peritoneal cavity." MosBY'S
MEDICAL. NURSING. & ALLIED HEALTH DICTIONARY 676 (3d ed. 1990). Laparoscopy entails:
[Tjhe insertion of a laparoscope of 13 inch in diameter through a small incision in the
abdomen to see inside the ovary. A needle is then inserted through a second incision
and the eggs and surrounding fluid are drained. The entire procedure is usually done
under general anesthesia. Because of the pain and accompanying risks of surgery, it is
recommended that the patient undergo the procedure only when deemed necessary.
Stanford P. Berenbaum, Note, Davis v. Davis: Frozen Embryos and the Thawing of Procreative
Liberties, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1337, 1338 n.ll (1990).
32. Lorio, supra note 23, at 1666; see also AUSMAN & SNYDER, supra note 20, § 1.32(d)(3)
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introduced. 3  Once a sperm fertilizes the egg34 it remains in a simu-
lated womb environment 5 for forty-eight to seventy-two hours.36
During this period the preembryo will grow into a two-, four-, six-,
or eight-celled entity. 7 At this point, one or more preembryos are
then cervically transferred to the woman's uterus by a catheter.3 8 If
all goes well, one of the early embryos implants itself in the uterine
wall, develops into a fetus, and is born approximately nine months
later. 9
(explaining the egg recovery process).
33. Lorio, supra note 23, at 1666. Chemicals are added to the petri dish in order to give the
sperm the ability to pierce the ovum's cell wall. Margie M. Eget, Note, The Solomon Decision: A
Study of Davis v. Davis, 42 MERCER L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1991).
34. It is a much debated, and still unsettled, question whether to call the developing fertilized
egg a zygote, conceptus, embryo, or preembryo. Robertson, Legal Structure of New Reproduc-
tion, supra note 29, at 952 n.45. Fertilization occurs in over 90 percent of the cases in which eggs
are inseminated. Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 28, at 407 n.3. Traditionally, "zygote"
has been used to denote the fertilized egg after fertilization, but prior to the first cellular division.
Davis, supra note 21, at 511. Some scholars define an embryo as the product of conception from
the precise moment of fertilization until approximately the eighth week. Id. Others define an
embryo as a "developing organism ... from about two weeks after fertilization to the end of the
seventh or eighth week." DORLAND'S, supra note 25, at 543. Still others feel that a fertilized egg is
only considered an embryo after it has been implanted in the mother's uterus. See Robertson,
Legal Structure of New Reproduction, supra note 29, at 952 n.45 (noting that the embryo does
not develop until after implantation). Thus, the term "preembryo" is used to denote a fertilized
egg before implantation. Id. "Early embryo" refers to the fertilized egg and subsequent develop-
mental stages, i.e., zygote, morula, and blastocyst, up until implantation and shortly thereafter.
Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 28, at 407 n.l.
Because the terms "preembryo" and "early embryo" have gained acceptance in legal-medical
literature, this Note will call all fertilized eggs not yet implanted in a woman's womb "preem-
bryos" or its synonym, "early embryos." After implantation, the zygotes will be called "embryos."
However, one should not confuse this with the term "frozen embryos," which is a term of art
denoting cryogenically-preserved preembryos. None of these terms are used to indicate that a
particular entity is or is not life, but rather are merely used for reference. Cf. Kim Schaefer,
Comment, In-vitro, Fertilization, Frozen Embryos, and The Right to Privacy - Are Mandatory
Donation Laws Constitutional?. 22 PAC. L.J 87, 90 n.23 (1990) (stating that "embryo" refers to
both pre-implantation and post-implantation embryos, although usually it refers to pre-implanta-
tion embryos).
35. Lorio, supra note 23, at 1166; see also AUSMAN & SNYDER, supra note 20, § 1.32 (d)(3)
(explaining how the embryo is incubated after fertilization).
36. Robertson, Legal Structure of New Reproduction, supra note 29, at 968.
37. Id.; see also AUSMAN & SNYDER, supra note 20, § 1.32 (d)(3) (explaining that the embryo
transfer occurs when there are between four and eight cells).
38. Robertson, Legal Structure of New Reproduction, supra note 29, at 948. Three or four
embryos is the maximum number that can be placed in a woman's uterus without causing undue
risk to the offspring and the mother from multifetal pregnancy. Robertson, Prior Agreements,
supra note 28, at 407 n.3.
39. Davis, supra note 21, at 510. There is a one in ten chance that any single transferred
embryo will implant in the woman's uterus. Robertson, Legal Structure of New Reproduction,
supra note 29, at 970 n.100. Because of a 25 to 35 percent chance of spontaneous abortion or
wastage, there is an even lower chance that an implanted embryo will come to term. Id.
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Preembryos that are not immediately transferred to a woman's
uterus may be preserved and stored for later implantation through
cryopreservation.4 ° Cryopreservation is extremely advantageous for
most couples utilizing IVF because the IVF process is costly4' and
both mentally and physically taxing;42 in general, the fewer egg re-
trievals a woman undergoes, the better. With cryopreservation, all
the eggs retrieved in one laparoscopy can be fertilized and the extra
preembryos preserved for later transfer."
Besides reducing both cost and physical suffering, cryopreserva-"
tion benefits women who cannot undergo laparoscopy a second time
due to damaged or blocked ovaries, or who anticipate future damage
to either their ovaries or eggs.44 Cryopreservation also reduces the
risk of a multiple pregnancy45 because only one preembryo need be
implanted at one time.4 Furthermore, one of the greatest benefits of
cryopreservation is that it delays the inherent ethical dilemmas con-
cerning the disposition of surplus preembryos; without cryopreserva-
40. Cryopreservation is "the maintaining of the viability of excised tissue or organs by storing
at very low temperatures." DORLAND'S, supra note 25, at 403. More specifically, preserving
preembryos consists of freezing them in liquid nitrogen at sub-zero temperatures. Marcia J.
Wurmbrand, Note, Frozen Embryos: Moral, Social, and Legal Implications, 59 S. CAL. L. REV.
1079, 1083 (1986).
41. Each attempt at ovum retrieval costs between $3,000-$5,000. Tzivia Schwartz, Comment,
Frozen Embryos: The Constitution on Ice, 19 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 267, 269 n.9 (1985). Approxi-
mately $38,000 is required to ensure a 50 percent chance of a live birth. Robertson, Legal Struc-
ture of New Reproduction, supra note 29, at 943-44 n.6.
42. One woman described just how taxing IVF can be:
There was a year of testing on me - biopsies, dyerotubogram, post-coitals; as well as
repeated tests of my husband. We had a programmed sex life keyed to a basal tem-
perature chart. At the end of that year an acute abdominal episode, improperly han-
dled, cost me the ovary and tube on the right side. After recovery from surgery, on to
a new doctor - more tests, more programmed sex life - everything was just fine,
"relax." Relaxing did no good. On to a new doctor. Discovery of a cyst on the left
ovary -resection by surgery. Six months later, success. Pregnancy -followed by
miscarriage at 13 weeks. On to another doctor - an activist. "We'll have you preg-
nant again in no time!" Emergency admission to the hospital after an acute reaction
to the fertility pills he prescribed. My cycles ceased. The best effort of men and their
medicine could not coax another cycle forth. At 31 1 experienced menopause due to
the surgical and medical assault on my ovaries..
GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE 174-75 (1985) (quoting Barbara Eck Menning, a sup-
porter of IVF).
43. Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 28, at 408.
44. Wurmbrand, supra note 40, at 1084. Radiation from undergoing X-rays might damage a
woman's ovaries. Id.
45. Id. n.35.
46. Without cryopreservation, the maximum number of fertilized eggs possible must be im-
planted in the woman's uterus immediately in order to avoid their inevitable expiration in the
laboratory. Id. at 1083.
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tion, a couple must immediately decide whether or not to destroy or
donate surplus embryos that cannot be presently transferred to the
woman's uterus. 7 Finally, cryopreservation may increase a woman's
odds of becoming pregnant. Because a woman utilizing cry-
opreservation has the ability to wait before implantation, previously
frozen preembryos can be placed in a woman's uterus during a nor-
mal menstrual cycle, when her body is free from drugs and surgical
intrusion, thereby making it easier for her to become pregnant. 48
For all of these reasons, many couples choose to utilize
cryopreservation.'
If preembryos are preserved through such cryogenic procedures,
several contingencies might arise which could make implantation
undesirable or even impossible for one or both of the parents.5" For
example, a couple might inadvertently allow too much time to lapse
before implanting the preembryos, rendering them unfit for implan-
tation.51 One spouse could die before implantation, or experiience a
change of heart.52 In addition, the couple might suddenly conceive
by natural means, or, as with the couple in the Davis case, decide to
separate or divorce. As a result, many IVF clinics require their pa-
tients to sign consent forms before beginning treatment that stipu-
late what the agency should do with the preembryos should any of
47. It must be noted that this ethical dilemma is merely prolonged and not terminated by
cryopreservation. For example, if a woman becomes pregnant after transferring the first preem-
bryo to her uterus, the decision to donate or destroy any surplus cryogenically-preserved preem-
bryos must then be made.
In order to avoid the dilemma presented by the existence of spare preembryos, some IVF clinics
remove only the number of eggs that can be fertilized and safely reimplanted and then reimplant
all those that are healthy, which is usually no more than two. Clifford Grobstein, The Moral Uses
of "Spare" Embryos, 12 HASTINGS CTR. REP.. June 1982, at 5.
Cryopreservation, however, also raises ethical considerations irrespective of the decision whether
to donate or destroy embryos. There are the unknown risks of birth defects, embryo loss due to
failure in mechanical support systems, unresolved questions of embryo ownership and inheritance
rights, the morality of placing human life forms in a suspended state of deep freeze, and the
length of time embryos can remain viable while frozen. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Fertility Soc'y,
Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies: The Moral and Legal Status of
the Preembryo, 53 FERTILITY & STERILITY 58S, 59S (Supp. 11 1990).
48. Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 28, at 408.
49. In 1987, a survey found that 63 percent of all in vitro fertilization programs offered embryo
freezing, with another 33 percent planning to offer the technique by 1990. Id. There were 73
children born due to the transfer of frozen embryos in 1988; in that year alone, 9,605 embryos
were frozen. Davis, supra note 21, at 511.
50. Panitch, supra note 27, at 548.
51. Cryopreservation cannot maintain a preembryo indefinitely; a maximum of ten years in
storage is recommended by most experts. Wurmbrand, supra note 40, at 1098.
52. See id. at 1098-99 (noting that experts have speculated about the dangers involved with
posthumous transfers).
530 [Vol. 43:523
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these contingencies occur. 53 As recently as 1990, twenty-three of
twenty-seven programs offering cryopreservation required patients
to sign such cryopreservation contracts.5" These agreements also
give patients the option to donate frozen embryos to other couples,
to donate them for use in research, or to discard the preembryos
altogether.5 5 Such agreements are advantageous because they maxi-
mize a couple's reproductive freedom, result in increased certainty
for patients and IVF programs, and help prevent costly disputes.56
B. Constitutional Rights Relevant to In Vitro Fertilization and
Cryopreservation
In vitro fertilization, if successful, enables an infertile couple to
produce a biologically-related child. Parenthood, whether induced
by IVF or natural means, and the family are the cornerstones of our
society; they are esteemed as inalienable rights of humankind. As
such, they receive the utmost protection by the United States Con-
stitution and Supreme Court.57 The Supreme Court closely guards
53. See id. at 1099 (suggesting that 1VF participants should be required to make their embryos
available for adoption).
54. Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 28, at 410.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 414.
57. The Supreme Court provides its strongest protection to certain rights or classes of people by
using a "strict" level of judicial scrutiny. The Bill of Rights, consisting of the first ten amend-
ments to the United States Constitution, catalogs several explicit or "enumerated" rights. For
example, the First Amendment states in clear and unequivocal language that "Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The Framers of the Constitution enumerated rights in the Constitution because they believed
them to be extremely important; thus, there is agreement that these rights are "fundamental."
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, II (1967). The proper standard of judicial scrutiny for cases
involving fundamental rights is strict scrutiny, where laws "must be shown to be necessary to the
accomplishment of some permissible state objective." Id. For example, the Court in Loving struck
down a miscegenation law prohibiting interracial marriage. Id. Because the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was enacted to prevent discrimination based on race, the Court found that the right to be
free from racial discrimination was fundamental. Id. Applying strict scrutiny, the Court found no
permissible justification for the law. Id. at 12.
By contrast, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not design it to protect other clas-
ses of individuals. Thus, laws affecting these "other" classes do not receive strict scrutiny. For
example, government action discriminating on the basis of such "unenumerated" classifications as
gender, alienage, and legitimacy receive an "intermediate" tier of scrutiny. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1544-65 (2d ed. 1988). Any classification undergoing interme-
diate scrutiny "must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
The Supreme Court will invoke a final tier of scrutiny when the issues involved in a case do not
concern, or even resemble, enumerated rights. Under "minimal" scrutiny, which is used in the
area of economic regulation, the Court will uphold legislation that has a "rational basis." See,
e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding a state law fixing the price of milk).
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family issues through the fundamental rights of privacy and
procreation.58
1. The Right of Privacy
Early in its history, the right of privacy did not explicitly extend
to the protection of familial matters. The Supreme Court first men-
tioned the right in Olmstead v. United States,59 where it was gener-
ally defined as "the right to be let alone."60 However, the Court
later held that the right of privacy extended to activities relating to
marriage,61 procreation,62 contraception, 3 family relationships,64
and child rearing and education. 5 Additionally, the Court expanded
58. Although it is not enumerated in the Constitution, the right of privacy has nevertheless
been found to be a fundamental right. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). The
Supreme Court has determined that a "penumbra" of unenumerated rights surrounds the Bill of
Rights. Id. In Griswold, Justice William Douglas pointed out that although the Bill of Rights does
not mention such things as the right to associate with people and the right to educate a child in a
school of the parent's choice, the First Amendment has been construed to include those rights. Id.
at 482; see, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that parents have a fundamen-
tal right to control the upbringing of their children). Without such "peripheral rights the specific
rights would be less secure." Griswold. 381 U.S. at 484-85. For this reason, peripheral rights such
as the right of privacy are very important, and are therefore treated as fundamental. Laws con-
cerning such peripheral rights are strictly scrutinized. See supra note 57 and accompanying text
(discussing strict scrutiny).
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Justice Blackmun enunciated the provisions of the Bill of
Rights that contribute to this peripheral right of privacy. Id. at 152-53. According to Justice
Blackmun, the right of privacy flows not only from the penumbra of the Bill of Rights enunciated
in Griswold, but also from: the First Amendment freedom of speech and assembly; the Fourth
Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures; the Fifth Amendment
right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; and the Ninth
Amendment prohibition against the disparaging of unenumerated rights retained by the people
through the enumerated rights of the Constitution. Id.
59. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (holding that evidence obtained by government officers through the
use of a wire-tap does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
60. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the use of evidence obtained by wire-
tapping is a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments).
61. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down a Virginia statute prohibiting mar-
riage between blacks and whites on equal protection grounds).
62. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute
requiring mandatory sterilization for repeat criminals).
63. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating a statute which prevented unmarried
couples from acquiring contraceptives).
64. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents ...[whose] obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder. And it is in recognition of this that [past] decisions have respected the private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.").
65. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down a state statute requiring
children to attend public schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating a state
law prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages to young children).
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the right of privacy in Eisenstadt v. Baird66 when it protected the
right of single individuals to use birth control devices.6 7 In Eisen-
stadt, Justice William Brennan asserted that "[i]f the right of pri-
vacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child."68 Precisely because private matters con-
cerning one's family and children affect people so vitally, the Court
treats them as fundamental rights. Thus, the Supreme Court will
strictly scrutinize any law or legal decision that infringes on private
matters or involves intimate aspects of family life. 9
2. The Right of Procreation
Procreation is one of the most intimate aspects of family life. Al-
though the right of privacy and the right of procreation are closely
related, the right of privacy is usually viewed as emanating from the
penumbra of the Bill of Rights, while the right of procreation
originates in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. o
Beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska,7 ' the Court has interpreted
the liberty aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment broadly to denote
"not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual .. . to marry, establish a home and bring up children,
...and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at com-
mon law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men."72 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,73 the Court relied on the Meyer
Court's reading of liberty in describing marriage and procreation as
"one of the basic civil rights of man .. .fundamental to the very
66. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
67. Id. at 443.
68. Id. at 453.
69. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
70. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, "No state shall ...deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law . U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
71. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
72. Id. at 399. In Meyer, a law forbidding the teaching of foreign languages to young children
was struck down as an unreasonable exercise of state police power. The Court felt that the legisla-
ture could not so materially interfere "with the power of parents to control the education of their
own." Id. at 401.
73. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). In Skinner, the Court determined Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal
Sterilization Act to be an unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 535.
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existence and survival of the race." '74 These statements evidence the
fact that only a compelling government interest may limit this im-
portant right.75
Two watershed Supreme Court cases illustrating that the right of
procreation is interrelated with the right of privacy are Griswold v.
Connecticut6 and Eisenstadt v. Baird.7 In these decisions, the Su-
preme Court held that a state could not prevent either married
couples or single couples, respectively, from using contraceptives.7
Although the Court relied on the right of privacy when deciding
both of these "contraception cases,"' 79  the two opinions also cite
Meyer and Skinner, the "procreational cases." 80 According to the
Supreme Court, one's ability to use contraceptives - or, in other
words, to decide not to have a child - has as much to do with the
right of procreation as it does with the right of privacy."
3. Cases Analyzing the Right of Privacy and the Right to
Procreate
The United States Supreme Court continued to develop the rights
of privacy and procreation throughout the 1970s, primarily in the
context of abortion. The leading case marking the Court's incursion
into this emotionally-charged area is Roe v. Wade.82
a. Roe v. Wade
Like contraception, the right to choose abortion over childbirth
involves the rights of privacy and procreation. Consequently, the Su-
preme Court relied on such rights when it decided Roe v. Wade and
74. Id. at 541.
75. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining the three tiers of judicial scrutiny).
76. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
77. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
78. Id. at 453; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486; see also Carey v. Population Servs., 431 U.S. 678
(1977) (striking down a New York law which made it a crime to sell or distribute any contracep-
tive of any kind to a minor under 16 as violative of the right of privacy).
79. Justice Brennan postulated: "Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of
marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
80. Id. at 482, 485; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
81. This connection is noted in Justice Brennan's oft-quoted statement in Eisenstadt: "If the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the deci-
sion whether to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453; see supra notes 66-68 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Brennan's opinion in Eisenstadt).
82. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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legalized abortion in the United States pursuant to certain
restrictions.
In Roe, the Supreme Court found the "right of privacy
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy." 8 However, the Court did not find the
right of privacy to be so broad as to consider it "absolute."8 4 The
Supreme Court legalized abortion by balancing a woman's interest
in the ability to terminate her pregnancy with the state's interest in
"preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman . . .
[and] in protecting the potentiality of human life."" On the one
hand, the Court found that a woman forced to continue an un-
wanted, perhaps medically dangerous, pregnancy could suffer great
harm.86 The court found it a very real possibility that a woman in
such circumstances could suffer from distress, psychological harm,
poor mental and physical health, and the social stigma associated
with unwed motherhood." On the other hand, the Court recognized
the state's interest in protecting a pregnant woman's health and the
health of her fetus.88 However, the Court went on to note that the
state's interest in protecting the health of the mother does not be-
come "compelling" until the end of the first trimester, when abor-
tions become more dangerous to perform.89 Moreover, the state's in-
terest in protecting the life of the fetus does not become
"compelling" until the fetus reaches the point of viability,90 at ap-
proximately the beginning of the third trimester.9 1 Thus, the Court
concluded that during the first trimester, the state does not possess a
compelling interest in the fetus and therefore cannot infringe on a
woman's right to privacy by denying her the choice to have an abor-
83. Id. at 153.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 162.
86. Id. at 153.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 154.
89. Id. at 163.
90. Id. Viability is the ability to survive outside the mother's womb without artificial support; it
is "especially said of a fetus that has reached such a stage of development that it can live outside
of the uterus." DORLAND'S, supra note 25, at 1834.
91. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 ("Viability is usually placed at about seven months . . . but may
occur earlier, even at 24 weeks."). But see Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490
(1989) (affirming the district court's finding that the earliest point of viability may be 20 weeks);
infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (discrediting the notion that viability begins with the
onset of the third trimester, as medical advances have pushed the point of viability to an earlier
time during pregnancy).
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tion.92 Accordingly, the Roe Court held that a state law prohibiting
abortions during the first trimester is unconstitutional.9"
However, during the second trimester the Roe Court found that
the balance tipped in favor of the state. At that time, the state pos-
sesses a compelling state interest in the woman's health and can
therefore place reasonable regulations on abortion relating "to the
preservation and protection of maternal health." '94 Further, during
the third trimester the state interest becomes compelling "[w]ith re-
spect to the ...interest in potential life"9 of the fetus, because
that is the point at which it becomes viable. Consequently, the
Court held that a state can completely proscribe abortion during the
third trimester, unless the procedure is necessary to "preserve the
life or health of the mother."9
Scholars assert that Roe affirms a woman's fundamental right not
to bear a child, and that this right exists as a corollary to the rights
of privacy and procreation.97 In fact, to many people Roe champions
the ultimate right of privacy because it encompasses the ability to
make decisions concerning one's body. Subsequent court decisions
have interpreted Roe as standing for the proposition that the Consti-
tution guarantees a woman's autonomy over private decisions involv-
ing procreation.98
b. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth
Autonomy over procreational decisions is often complicated by
the fact that procreation necessarily involves two parties. However,
if the decision of whether to bear or beget a child affects the auton-
omy and bodily integrity of one partner more than the other, the
Supreme Court has, in effect, held that the privacy interests of that
92. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 163.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 163-64.
97. See Robertson, Legal Status of Early Embryos, supra note 27, at 484 n.117 (noting that,
under Roe, a woman has a fundamental right to determine whether pregnancy will continue);
Renee M. Hom, Note, Wrongful Conception: North Carolina's Newest Prenatal Tort Claim -
Jackson v. Bumgardner, 65 N.C. L. REV. 1077, 1085 n.75 (1987) (stating that Roe was "instru-
mental in establishing the principle that one has a fundamental right not to conceive or bear a
child"); Developments in the Law - Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519,
1562 (1990) (noting a woman's "Roe-guaranteed right not to procreate").
98. See. e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2810 (1992)
(noting that Roe provided a rule of personal autonomy and bodily integrity).
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partner are controlling. 9 In Planned Parenthood of Missouri v.
Danforth, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a third
party, the "father" of the fetus, could assert an interest strong
enough to justify prohibiting a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy during the first trimester. 100 The Court, relying on Roe,
reasoned that because the state itself does not have the power to
invade a woman's bodily integrity in this manner, "the State cannot
delegate authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to pre-
vent abortion ... ."-0o Moreover, the Court balanced the privacy
interests of the parties and found that because the woman is "more
directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy,"' 02 her decision
of whether to bear or beget the child should control. 103 According to
the Court, a woman has complete authority concerning the decision
of whether or not to terminate her pregnancy during the first trimes-
ter,0 4 since the Roe Court had already found that there is no com-
pelling state interest justifying a state prohibition on abortion during
this time period. 10 5 Because a woman's physical being is involved,
the Court in Danforth held that a woman's right of privacy, in the
context of pregnancy overrides the man's right of autonomy over
procreational decisions.10 6
C. The Status of the Preembryo
Thus far, the U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly extended the
right of procreation only to procreation involving sexual intercourse
between a man and a woman. Non-coital methods of reproduc-
tion, 107 such as IVF, have not been explicitly protected by the
99. Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
100. Id. at 69.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 71.
103. Id.
104. The Court noted:
The obvious fact in that when the wife and the husband disagree on [the abortion]
decision, the view of only one of the two marriage partners can prevail. Inasmuch as it
is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and imme-
diately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her
favor.
Id.
105. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Roe that a state
does not have a compelling interest in protecting the health of the mother or the life of the fetus
during the first trimester).
106. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71.
107. "Non-coital" is defined as a means of reproducing one's genes that is not dependent on
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United States Supreme Court. Courts also have paid little attention
to preembryos, the product of IVF procedures. Resolution of dis-
putes over frozen embryos will depend, in large part, on how courts
determine the legal status of these entities. There are four different
views concerning the legal status of preembryos: the "Right-to-Life"
stance, the current constitutional view held by the Supreme Court,
the Special Respect approach, and the private property notion.
1. The "Right-to-Life" Position
Proponents of the Right-to-Life view would accord a preembryo
the full rights and protections of persons under the law because they
believe life begins at the "moment" of conception. 10 8 Their credo is,
"If life begins at conception, then no egg should be injured or de-
stroyed once fertilized."1 °9 The Right-to-Life view mandates that
every preembryo be implanted in a uterus and given the opportunity
to gestate." ° Therefore, actions which might harm a preembryo,
such as freezing or research, should be banned."' If preembryo
freezing does occur, thawing must take place before expiration, and
transfer to a uterus for possible implantation must ensue. Right-to-
Life advocates worry that the potential abuse of in vitro fertilization
and cryopreservation technology will threaten the dignity of human
life and the public welfare.'1 2 According to these advocates, the law
should proceed with extreme caution when dealing with preserved
embryos.
The state of Louisiana recently codified the Right-to-Life ap-
proach when it chose to grant full protection under the law to
preembryos in its statute regulating IVF, stating: "An in vitro fertil-
ized human ovum exists as a juridical person until such time as the
in vitro fertilized ovum is implanted in the womb; or at any other
time when rights attach to an unborn child in accordance with
sexual intercourse between a man and a woman. DORLAND'S, supra note 25, at 355.
108. The Roman Catholic Church adheres to this position. Wurmbrand, supra note 40, at
1090.
109. Lorio, supra note 23, at 1667-68.
110. Christi D. Ahnen, Comment, Disputes Over Frozen Embryos: Who Wins, Who Loses, and
How Do We Decide? - An Analysis of Davis v. Davis, York v. Jones, and State Statutes Affect-
ing Reproductive Choices, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1299, 1302 (1991).
I11. Robertson, Legal Structure of New Reproduction, supra note 29, at 971.
112. See Davis, supra note 21, at 532 (discussing the opinion that a frozen embryo deserves
greater protection than a nonfrozen embryo in order to preserve human dignity and effectuate the
state's interest in protecting potential life).
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law."11 1 3 As of this writing, the statute's constitutionality had not
been challenged.
2. The Current Constitutional View
A second position regarding the status of preembryos exists in the
realm of constitutional law. In Roe v. Wade,114 the United States
Supreme Court decided that the word "person," as used throughout
the Constitution and especially in the Fourteenth Amendment, does
not include the unborn.'15 Although the Constitution does not define
the word "person," the Court found that "use of the word is such
that it has application only postnatally."' 1 6 The Court based its con-
clusions on a comprehensive review of religious, medical, and legal
history, and determined that no rights are instilled in a fetus until
live birth. 17 This reasoning was necessary to support the Court's
decision that pregnancies can be terminated during the first and sec-
ond trimester of pregnancy, limited only by "reasonable" state
regulations."'
Because the Supreme Court does not view fetuses as "persons" in
terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, it would seem to follow that
the Supreme Court would not view preembryos as "persons"' ei-
ther. 19 A preembryo, when compared to a fetus, has a rudimentary
113. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (West 1991). The Supreme Court's holding in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), may support the ability of Louisiana to make
such a declaration. In Webster, the Court left intact the preamble of a Missouri statute regulating
abortion, which states that the "life of each human being begins at conception" and that "unborn
children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being." Id. at 504. Because the pream-
ble merely exercises the "authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth," the
Court allowed the preamble to stand without passing on its constitutionality. Id. at 506 (citing
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)); see infra notes 208-10 and accompanying text (describing
the Davis trial court's use of Webster to justify its holding that "life begins at conception").
114. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
115. Id. at 158.
116. Id. at 157.
117. Id. at 160-62. The court noted, in part, that "[t]he Aristotelian theory of 'mediate anima-
tion' . . . held sway throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance in Europe . . . . [T]he
traditional rule of tort law denied recovery for prenatal injuries even though the child was born
alive.. . . [U]nborn children have been recognized as acquiring rights or interest by way of inher-
itance or other devolution of property ...contingent upon live birth." Id.
118. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text (discussing the Roe framework). This hold-
ing was specifically affirmed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2804 (1992).
119. Panitch, supra note 27, at 560. Most states adhere to the view that preembryos are not
persons in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. States do not impose criminal sanctions for
the destruction of preembryos and generally do not require doctors to implant all fertilized eggs.
Id. Furthermore, intrauterine devices ("IUDs") are legal in all states; this method of birth control
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biological status. Unlike a fetus, a preembryo must be transferred to
a uterus for development and birth to eventually occur. 12 0 Fetuses,
on the other hand, are much closer to viability than are preembryos.
Therefore, according to the view of the Supreme Court as defined
by Roe and its progeny, only a compelling state interest can override
a parent's privacy and procreational rights in the cryopreservation
or destruction of a preembryo. 12 1
3. The Special Respect Approach
A third distinct position, while consistent with the constitutional
view of preembryos, holds that preembryos deserve "special re-
spect." Proponents of this view feel that a preembryo possesses
moral significance because, when transferred to a uterus, it has the
potential to develop into a human being.'22 Additionally, to those
undergoing treatment for infertility, a preembryo symbolizes hope
and potential parenthood; 21 the preembryo "affirms the couple's po-
tency."' 4 Indeed, "It is a powerful symbol with which [IVF partici-
pants] establish emotional connections. It may be the closest thing
to parenthood the [participants] experience."'' 25 For these reasons,
some scholars believe that a preembryo cannot be treated like mere
human tissue, but instead is deserving of "special respect." '26 Ad-
destroys preembryos at the same stage of development as those frozen for in vitro fertilization. Id.
Thus, it is almost impossible to punish the destruction of preembryos without running afoul of at
least one constitutional principle.
120. Robertson, Legal Structure of New Reproduction, supra note 29, at 973 n. 109.
121. This is not to say that reasonable regulations which do not significantly infringe on the
privacy and procreational rights of gamete-providers could not be instituted. Cf. Roe, 410 U.S. at
164-65 (holding that certain regulations may be instituted depending on how far the pregnancy
has progressed).
122. Robertson, Legal Structure of New Reproduction, supra note 29, at 972; see also Robert-
son, Legal Status of Early Embryos, supra note 27, at 446 n.31 (noting several influential advi-
sory bodies that have examined new reproductive technologies and have advocated the Special
Respect view, including the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the British Warnock
Committee, and the American Fertility Society).
123. Robertson, Legal Structure of New Reproduction, supra note 29, at 972.
124. Id.
125. Robertson, Legal Status of Early Embryos, supra note 27, at 448 n.34.
126. The Special Respect view has the strongest support both nationally and internationally.
Panitch, supra note 27, at 565. The theory has been promulgated by several influential panels that
have examined the issues arising out of in vitro fertilization and other modern reproductive tech-
nologies. For example, the American Fertility Society is of the view that:
[T]he preembryo deserves respect greater than that accorded to human tissue but not
the respect accorded to actual persons. The preembryo is due greater respect than
other human tissue because [sic] of its potential to become a person and because of its
symbolic meaning for many people. Yet, it should not be treated as a person, because
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herents to this view argue that preembryos should be transferred to
a uterus whenever reasonable.127
The Ethics Advisory Board of the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare ("EAB") advocates the Special Respect stance.
In 1979, the EAB declared that the human embryo is entitled to
profound respect, but that this respect does not necessarily encom-
pass the full legal and moral rights attributed to persons. 128 The
EAB concluded that preembryos do not deserve the rights and du-
ties of "persons"' 12 9 because they lack a differentiated nervous sys-
tem, cannot think or feel, and are not yet individuals. 3 ' In accor-
dance with the EAB's findings, the Special Respect position holds
that discarding or failing to transfer embryos to a uterus is ethically
and legally acceptable.' 3'
4. Preembryos as Personal Property
A fourth view determines preembryo status by utilizing a prop-
erty model. The property model shifts the focus from the preem-
bryos themselves to those who have "rights" or "property" interests
in them. Such rights are evidenced by decisional authority over the
preembryos. The American Fertility Society ("AFS"), a medical
sub-specialty association dedicated to the study and practice of re-
productive medicine, espouses this view.' In an ethical statement
published in 1984, the AFS stated that "gametes and concepti
[preembryos] are the property of the donors. The donors therefore
have the right to decide at their sole discretion the disposition of
these items . . . ."I" Additionally, Professor John Robertson, a
it has not yet developed the features of personhood, is not yet established as develop-
mentally individual, and may never realize its biologic potential.
Ethics Comm. of the Am. Fertility Soc'y, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Tech-
nologies: The Moral and Legal Status of the Preembryo, 46 FERTILITY & STERILITY 29S-30S
(Supp. 1 1986).
127. Ahnen, supra note 110, at 1302.
128. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, REPORT AND CONCLUSIONS: HEW Sup-
PORT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER, 44
Fed. Reg. 35,033, 35,056 (1979). However, the EAB did not define "profound respect" as used in
this context. Davis, supra note 21, at 516.
129. Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 28, at 409.
130. Robertson, Legal Structure of New Reproduction, supra note 29, at 970.
131. Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 28, at 409.
132. Ahnen, supra note 110, at 1306.
133. American Fertility Soc'y, Ethical Statement on In Vitro Fertilization, 41 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 12 (1984).
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leading expert in the field of non-coital reproduction and the law,"3 4
feels that viewing preembryos as property "reconciles personal pro-
creative goals and respect for potential. life in a generally satisfac-
tory way.' 1 35 Support of this view by both the AFS and Professor
Robertson has helped it acquire wide acceptance. 36
For example, in York v. Jones,1 37 a Virginia court adhered to the
property model in settling a dispute over frozen embryos between
the "parents" of the preembryos and the clinic who created and
stored the preembryos. 38 When the Yorks entered into the IVF pro-
gram at the Jones Institute for Reproductive Medicine in Norfolk,
Virginia, they signed a "cryopreservation agreement."' 39 The agree-
ment consistently referred to the early embryos as the "property" of
the Yorks. 4 Consequently, the court concluded that the agreement
created a bailor-bailee relationship between the Yorks and the Jones
Institute, and therefore treated the frozen embryos as property of
the genetic parents, the Yorks."4
However, Professor Robertson carefully points out that property
terms do not "signify that embryos may be treated in all respects
like other property. Rather, the terms merely designate who has au-
thority to decide whether legally available options with early em-
bryos will occur, such as creation, storage, discard, donation, use in
research, and placement in a uterus."' 42 According to the property
model, this decisional authority varies at different points in the IVF
process. For example, in deciding when preembryos "are or might
be placed in the woman's body . . . [t]he woman appears to be the
appropriate decision-maker, because her bodily interests are directly
134. Professor Robertson is the Baker and Botts Professor of Law at the University of Texas at
Austin. See infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text (discussing the views of Professor
Robertson).
135. Robertson, Legal Status of Early Embryos, supra note 27, at 516.
136. See, e.g., York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989); see also infra notes 137-41
and accompanying text (discussing the York case).
137. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
138. Id. at 425.
139. Id. at 424.
140. Id. at 425.
141. The practical effect of a bailor-bailee agreement is to impose on the bailee (here the Jones
Institute) an absolute obligation to return the subject of the bailment (here the frozen embryos) to
the bailor (the Yorks) once the purpose of the bailment has terminated. Id.
142. Robertson, Legal Status of Early Embryos, supra note 27, at 454-55. "A person is the
owner of his or her gametes in several senses. The person decides whether he or she will -
through masturbation, egg retrieval, or coitus - make his or her gametes available for examina-
tion, gift, or reproduction." Id. at 457.
[Vol. 43:523
PROCREATIONAL FREEDOM
implicated." '14 Decisional authority is "less clear" when an early
embryo is located outside of a woman's body.14" However, because
preembryos have the same reproductive significance for each gam-
ete-donor, the property model concludes that both "parents" have
equal say in their disposition when no bodily interests are impli-
cated. Thus, the property model creates joint authority among gam-
ete-donors by treating preembryos as property. 145
D. Summary
A discussion of the four theories regarding the status of preem-
bryos only scratches the surface of the issues arising in the context
of in vitro fertilization. Which of these theories is correct or most
appropriate is a matter of great controversy. Furthermore, because
IVF is a technique used to produce offspring, it invokes both rights
of privacy and procreation. The scope of these rights is yet another
hotly-debated issue. The next section of this Note addresses these
questions through a detailed discussion of Davis v. Davis.
II. SUBJECT OPINION
In Davis v. Davis,4" a couple in the process of getting divorced
battled over the "custody" of seven cryogenically-preserved preem-
bryos created by in vitro fertilization.4 7 During their marriage, the
Davises attempted to conceive a child using IVF because of Mary
Sue Davis's infertility.'48 The Davises, however, did not sign a prior
dispositional agreement determining what would happen to their
preembryos should a contingency, such as divorce, arise. 49 Junior
Davis then filed for divorce several years after beginning the IVF
procedures.' 50 The only contested issue was the disposition of the
seven preembryos. Mary Sue wished to see the early embryos im-
planted and brought to term, while Junior wished to see them termi-
143. Id. at 454.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 454 n.50. This is true even though a woman undergoes greater burdens and more
intrusive procedures than does a man participating in in vitro fertilization; i.e., surgery versus
masturbation. Id.
146. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert denied sub nom. Stowe v. Davis, 113 S. Ct. 1259
(1993).
147. Id. at 589.
148. Id. at 591.
149. Id. at 592; see also supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (discussing the nature and
desirability of cryopreservation contracts).
150. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 592.
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nated. 151 After a long, painful court battle, the Tennessee Supreme
Court ruled definitively in favor of Junior Davis.'52
A. The Facts of Davis v. Davis
Mary Sue and Junior Davis met in Germany while both were
serving in the United States Army.1 53 They were married in 1980,
and Mary Sue became pregnant shortly thereafter.154 However, the
pregnancy was ectopic,155 and Mary Sue suffered a miscarriage.158
Mary Sue's right fallopian tube was removed as a result of compli-
cations from this pregnancy. 5 Four more tubal pregnancies fol-
lowed;' 58 the final one, which ruptured Mary Sue's left fallopian
tube, was nearly fatal.' 59 Mary Sue and her physicians concluded it
would be best to ligate the fallopian tube, 160 leaving her completely
unable to conceive by natural means.'
The Davises persevered in their plans to have children by institut-
ing adoption proceedings.'62 However, at the last moment a pending
adoption fell through.163 Then in 1985, under the guidance of Dr.
Irving King of the Fertility Center of East Tennessee,'" the couple
began in vitro fertilization treatment. 65 Although six attempts at
IVF were made between 1985 and 1988, at a total cost of $35,000,
151. Id.
152. See infra notes 236-71 and accompanying text (discussing the Tennessee Supreme Court's
rationale in ruling in favor of Junior Davis).
153. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591.
154. Id.
155. Id. Ectopic pregnancy, or "tubal pregnancy," is "pregnancy arising from implantation of
the fertilized ovum somewhere other than in the endometrium, often in the fallopian tube. Such
an extrauterine pregnancy is usually short-lived, but may cause an acute abdominal emergency by
rupturing the tube." I THE OXFORD COMPANION TO MEDICINE 331 (John Walton et al. eds.,
1986).
156. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591.
157. Id.
158. Id.: see also supra note 155 (defining tubal pregnancy).
159. Mark Curriden, Frozen Embryos: The New Frontier, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1989, at 68.
160. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591. Ligating a fallopian tube consists of tying it or binding it with
a ligature, which is "any substance, such as catgut, cotton, silk, or wire, used to tie a vessel or
strangulate a part." DORLAND'S. supra note 25, at 935.
161. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591.
162. Id.
163. The mother of the child they were expecting to adopt decided to keep the child. Id.
164. Mark A. Pieper, Note, Frozen Embryos - Persons or Property?: Davis v. Davis, 23
CREIGHTON L. REV. 807, 808 (1990).
165. See supra notes 20-56 and accompanying text (discussing IVF methods). 1IVF was virtu-
ally the only available means by which Mary Sue could give birth to her own genetic child. Davis
v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *2 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989).
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none was successful. 166 Because in vitro fertilization had failed, the
Davises repeated their attempts to adopt a child.'67 Once again,
however, the adoption was unsuccessful. 6"
In the fall of 1988, the Davises decided to return to the Fertility
Center of East Tennessee and utilize its new cryopreservation pro-
gram. 6 9 The Davises briefly discussed donating their cryopreserved
preembryos to another childless couple if Mary Sue were to become
pregnant on the first attempt at implantation. 7 0 Still, the couple
never came to a definite conclusion as to the fate of the preem-
bryos. 17  Notwithstanding this uncertainty, the Fertility Center did
not require the Davises to sign any advance directives for disposition
of the preembryos. 172
In December of 1988, the Fertility Center surgically aspirated
nine ova from Mary Sue Davis. 173 All nine eggs were successfully
fertilized, and two of the resulting preembryos were immediately
transferred to Mrs. Davis.7 4 Neither resulted in a pregnancy.171
The Fertility Center then cryogenically preserved the remaining
seven, but before any of the frozen embryos could be thawed and
implanted, Junior Davis filed for divorce. 7 6
The fate of the Davises' seven cryogenically-preserved preembryos
became the main dispute in their divorce proceedings. Mary Sue
asked for permission to implant the embryos because she felt that
the "painful, physically trying, emotionally and mentally taxing or-
deals she endured to participate in the program" should not be
wasted. 7 Mary Sue also believed that the embryos constituted
166. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591. The Davises' combined annual income at this time was
$35,500. Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *1.
167. Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *2.
168. Id.
169. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 592; see also supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text (discussing
cryopreservation procedures).
170. Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *3. No other contingency was mentioned. See supra notes
139-41 and accompanying text (discussing the use of a cryopreservation agreement in York v.
Jones).
171. Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *3.
172. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *4 n.6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept.
13, 1990); see generally Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 28, at 410 (explaining the na-
ture of advance directives for cryogenically-preserved embryos).
173. Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *3.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. The original complaint for the disposition of the embryos was filed on February 23, 1989.
Id.
177. Id. at *25; see generally COREA, supra note 42 (depicting the excruciating physical and
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human "life"; 78 her doctors described the result of leaving the
preembryos in a cryogenically-preserved state as "passive death."' 79
According to Mary Sue, implantation was necessary to save the
lives of her "children."' 80
Junior Davis, on the other hand, vehemently opposed implanta-
tion. His parents had divorced when he was a small child, and he
was familiar with the affects of divorce on children.' 8 1 He wanted to
prevent his offspring from suffering any pain due to the dissolution
of his marriage. 82 Junior, therefore, wanted the court to grant him
and Mary Sue joint custody of the preembryos so that they could
together decide the fate of the preembryos.183 In the alternative, if
the court would not allow joint custody, Junior wanted to altogether
prohibit the preembryos from being implanted. 84 Junior felt that
bringing the preembryos to term would violate his fundamental re-
productive rights by forcing unwanted parenthood upon him.185
In the event the court ruled that the preembryos could be im-
planted, Junior wanted only Mary Sue to receive them and did not
want them donated to another couple.' 86 Junior felt donation of the
preembryos would not allow him to take part in the lives of his bio-
logical children; if he were forced to become a parent, Junior
wanted to be involved. 87 Junior was also opposed to donation be-
cause there was no guarantee that his children would be raised in a
stable environment. 88 Furthermore, Junior stated that he would
suffer "enhanced apprehension for the child's welfare,"' 89 and that
mental rigors associated with laparoscopy and IVF).
178. Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *26; see also supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text
(describing the "Right-to-Life" view of preembryo status).
179. Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *26.
180. Id.
181. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nor. Stowe v. Davis,
113 S.Ct 1259 (1993).
182. Id. at 604. Junior was five years old when his parents divorced. After his mother suffered a
nervous breakdown, Junior and his three brothers were sent to a boys home, while one sister
remained with an aunt and the other stayed with their mother. Junior saw his father a total of
three times after his parents were divorced. He testified that he suffered severe problems due to
his separation from his parents and, particularly, his father's absence. Id. at 603-04.
183. Davis. 1989 WL 140495, at *19.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at *20.
187. Id.
188. Id. Because of his own experiences, Junior wanted his children to be raised in an atmo-
sphere where they would not have to experience the effects of a divorce. Id.
189. Id.
[Vol. 43:523
PROCREATIONAL FREEDOM
any uncertainty as to its whereabouts would place "a great psycho-
logical and emotional burden on both him and Mrs. Davis."' 190 Jun-
ior's anticipation of this negative psychological reaction was so
strong that he favored destruction of the preembryos over their do-
nation.""' To Junior, destruction was permissible because the preem-
bryos did not constitute life, but merely the potential for life. 192
B. Procedural History
1. The Trial Court's Opinion
The Circuit Court of Blount County, Tennessee, rejected Junior
Davis's arguments and awarded custody of the preembryos to Mary
Sue Davis for implantation.193 The court analyzed the intent of both
parties and concluded that "Mr. and Mrs. Davis participated in the
IVF program . . . for one purpose: to produce a human being to be
known as their child."' 9' To determine whether or not this intent
had been realized, the court felt compelled to answer the question,
"When does human life begin?"' 95
Several experts presented testimony on this issue at trial. Doctor
Irving King - the Davises' fertility physician - and Professor
Robertson' testified that the Davises' cryogenically-preserved
preembryos were undifferentiated, nonunique cells;' therefore, they
did not deserve the unqualified rights possessed by human beings.'98
Adhering to the Right-to-Life view, 9 9 Dr. Jerome Lejeune, a
world-renowned human geneticist, 20 disagreed with this testimony.
190. Id.
191. Id. at *19.
192. Id. at *20.
193. Id. at *1.
194. Id. at *3.
195. Id.
196. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (describing Professor Robertson's qualifi-
cations and discussing his views regarding the status of preembryos).
197. Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *5.
198. King and Robertson relied in part on the views of the Ethics Committee of the American
Fertility Society ("AFS"), which found "a widespread consensus that the preembryo is not a
person but is to be treated with special respect because ... [it] might become a person." The
Ethics Comm. of the Am. Fertility Soc'y, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Tech-
nologies: The Moral and Legal Status of the Preembryo, 46 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305 (Supp.
1 1986); see also supra notes 122-31 and accompanying text (discussing the Special Respect view
of preembryos).
199. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text (delineating the Right-to-Life position
regarding preembryos).
200. Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *26.
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Lejeune testified that recent advances in DNA technology proved
that "[w]hen the first cell exists . . . a '. . . tiny human being ...'
exists."20 ' Lejeune stated that even the most rudimentary human
cells are differentiated and "specialized, 2 °2 and he concluded that
the only moral choice for a frozen preembryo is implantation. 0 3
The trial court accepted the Right-to-Life view promulgated by
Dr. Lejeune and decided that the seven cryopreserved preembryos
were "human beings."2 4 The court concluded that the Davises had
fulfilled their "original intent to produce a human being. 20 5 To re-
solve the couple's dispute over these "children," the trial court at-
tempted to determine the children's rights.20 6
The trial court surveyed state case law in the area of in vitro fer-
tilization and found that no state, including Tennessee, had estab-
lished public policy recognizing the rights of preembroys. 20 7 How-
ever, the court decided that the Supreme Court, in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services,208 "[L]eft open the door for a state
to establish its compelling interest in protecting even potential
human life by legislation declaring its public policy. '2 9 In light of
Webster, the trial court determined that Tennessee's interest in pro-
tecting potential human life could come into existence before the
point of viability. 10
201. Id. at *5.
202. Id.
203. Dr. Lejeune believed that "the hospitality of [Mrs. Davis's] body [wa]s the best place in
the world for [the preembryos] to be." Id. at *28.
204. Id. at *9.
205. Id.
206. Id. The trial court reviewed the Tennessee Wrongful Death Statute and concluded that it
could not help determine the rights of the preembryos. The Wrongful Death Statute which allows
immediate family members to "inherit" the right of a decedent to bring a lawsuit was inapposite
to the facts of Davis because "an unborn child is accorded status only if the child is viable at the
time of injury." Id. The Wrongful Death Statute did not apply because the seven embryos at issue
had not "achieved a stage of development where [they] could reasonably be expected to, be capa-
ble of living outside the uterus." Id. The state's criminal abortion statute was also inapplicable
because "the child is accorded no recognized status during the first three months of its mother's
pregnancy." Id. The trial court reasoned that, since there was no pregnancy to abort, the abortion
statute could not decide the preembryos' rights. Id.
207. Id.
208. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
209. Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *9. In Webster, a Missouri statute regulating the performance
of abortions was upheld. The statute's preamble declared that the Missouri legislature had found
that "[t]he life of each human being begins at conception." Webster, 492 U.S. at 504. The Court
held that the preamble was a permissible value judgment of the state favoring childbirth over
abortion. Id. at 506.
210. Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *9-10.
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Traditionally, the state protects its interests in children by using
the common law doctrine of parens patriae.21' The trial court ex-
tended this doctrine to cases involving frozen preembryos and found
that it was in the best interests of the "children" that Mary Sue
Davis proceed with implantation, because allowing the preembryos
to remain preserved for more than two years was tantamount to
their ultimate destruction. 12 The trial court, therefore, awarded
temporary custody of the preembryos to Mary Sue.213
2. The Appellate Court's Opinion
Junior Davis appealed the trial court's ruling and the court of
appeals ruled in his favor.214 The fact that the positions of the par-
ties had changed dramatically in the interim between the trial
court's ruling and Junior Davis's appeal greatly influenced the ap-
pellate court.1 5 Both Mary Sue and Junior had remarried.1 6 Con-
sequently, Mary Sue no longer wished to give birth to Junior's child
and intended to donate the preembryos to another couple.21 7 Junior
continued to assert that the trial court's decision violated his right to
control reproduction.218
The court of appeals reversed the decision based on several errors
in the trial court's findings. First, the appellate court rejected the
trial court's determination that the preembryos were human life.21 '
The court noted that the Right-to-Life view failed to recognize "sig-
nificant scientific distinctions between fertilized ova that have not
been implanted [preembryos] and an embryo in the mother's
womb. ' 220 The court of appeals concluded that the two distinct enti-
211. The common law doctrine of parens patriae is defined as "that power of the sovereign to
watch over the interests of those who are incapable of protecting themselves. The doctrine
• . .is most commonly expressed as the 'best interests of the child doctrine'.. Id. at *10-11.
212. Id. at *11.
213. Id.
214. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990).
215. Id. at *1-3.
216. Id. at *1.
217. Id. n.I.
218. Id. at *2.
219. Id. at *3.
220. Id. at *1. The court of appeals discussed in detail the differences between a preembryo
and an embryo. The frozen embryos at issue were comprised of four to eight identical cells, with
no differentiation of body parts, and no nervous, circulatory, or pulmonary systems. Id. The
preembryo's growth is perhaps forever arrested at this juncture by cryopreservation. Id. In con-
trast, an embryo in the mother's womb has differentiated cell structure. Id.
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ties could not hold identical rights.22'
Secondly, the appellate court determined that the trial court had
ignored the existing public policy behind Tennessee statutes con-
cerning the status of other unborn entities.222 Tennessee had previ-
ously enacted a wrongful death statute22' as well as abortion, mur-
der, and assault statutes.224 To the court of appeals, these statutes
reflected the Tennessee legislature's opinion that "embryos . . . are
not given legal status equivalent to that of a person already
born. ' 225 The trial court's holding clearly contradicted these policies
because the trial court had decided that preembryos were "human
beings" deserving of the full protection of the law.226
Lastly, the appellate court reversed the holding of the trial court
because it believed the trial court had ignored Supreme Court deci-
sions which involved a fundamental right not only to procreate,
227
but to prevent procreation.228 The court of appeals noted that by
awarding the preembryos to Mary Sue for implantation, the trial
court had "decid[ed] that Junior may be required to become a par-
ent against his will, thus denying to him the right to control repro-
duction. ' 229 The appellate court found nothing to support this deter-
mination; the trial court had cited no compelling state interest23 0 to
justify this abrogation of Junior's fundamental rights. 231
Having reversed the trial court, the court of appeals fashioned a
new resolution to the Davises' dilemma by implicitly adopting the
property model of preembryo disposition. In support of this theory,
221. Id. at *2-3.
222. Id. at *3.
223. Tennessee's Wrongful Death Statute does not allow recovery for the wrongful death of a
fetus that is not first born alive. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106 (1980).
224. In Tennessee, murder of or assault on a viable fetus may be a crime, but abortion is not.
See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-107, 39-13-214 (1991). The Tennessee abortion statute incorpo-
rates Roe's trimester approach. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-201(c) (1991); supra notes 83-98
and accompanying text (discussing the Roe decision).
225. Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *2.
226. See supra notes 204-13 and accompanying text (discussing the trial court's reasons for
awarding custody of the preembryos to Mary Sue Davis).
227. Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *2 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)); see
supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text (explaining the right of procreation).
228. Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *2 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 436 (1972); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965)); see
supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (describing the implicit right to prevent procreation).
229. Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *2.
230. Id.
231. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (explaining the three standards of judicial
review used for fundamental and nonfundamental rights and noting the cases in which the Su-
preme Court deemed the right of privacy to be a fundamental right).
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the appellate court pointed out that Tennessee had made it a felony
to experiment, research, or photograph an aborted fetus without the
consent of its mother.2"' Further, the appellate court relied on York
v. Jones,233 the only previous American case to address the issue of
cryopreserved preembryo disposition. The York court had treated
disputed preembryos as the property of the gamete-donors who cre-
ated them.23 4 Accordingly, the court of appeals granted Mary Sue
and Junior joint control of the preembryos and "equal voice over
their disposition."2 5
C. The Tennessee Supreme Court's Opinion
Mary Sue contested the validity of the appellate court's adoption
of the property model in her appeal to the Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee."6 The supreme court disagreed with the property model, as
well as with the trial court's "Right-to-Life" view of the preem-
bryos.23 7 The court did find, however, that awarding sole custody of
the preembryos to Mary Sue violated Junior Davis's procreational
rights.238
First, the Tennessee Supreme Court based its reasoning on the
conclusion that the seven cryogenically-preserved entities were
"preembryos" distinct and separate from embryos.2"9 The supreme
court thus rejected the Right-to-Life view adhered to by the trial
court.240 Next, the Tennessee Supreme Court determined the legal
status of the preembryos. The court first affirmed the finding that
232. Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *3 n.8 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-208 (1991)).
233. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989); see supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the York court's adoption of the property model).
234. York, 717 F. Supp. at 424-25.
235. Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *3; see supra notes 132-45 and accompanying text (explain-
ing the property model for determining the status of preembryos). The court of appeals did not
guide Mary Sue and Junior as to how "joint custody" would work, especially if the former spouses
were to continue to disagree. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598 (Tenn. 1992).
236. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590.
237. Id. at 597.
238. Id. at 604.
239. Id. at 594. Although it was not dispositive, "[the distinction] deserve[d] emphasis ...
because inaccuracy [might] lead to misanalysis such as occurred at the trial level in this case." Id.
240. The Tennessee Supreme Court did not find Dr. Lejeune, who espoused the Right-to-Life
view at trial, as credible as did the trial court. Lejeune's "background fail[ed] to reflect any
degree of expertise in obstetrics or gynecology (specifically in the field of infertility) or in medical
ethics. His testimony revealed a profound confusion between science and religion." Id. at 593; see
also supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text (describing the testimony of Dr. Lejeune before
the trial court).
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the preembryos were not "persons, "241 agreeing with the appellate
court that Tennessee's wrongful death, abortion, murder, and crimi-
nal statutes, as well as federal law, did not treat nonviable entities
as "persons. 242 Further, the court cited Roe's holding that fetuses
are not "persons" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 3 It
was obvious to the court that the state of fetal development dis-
cussed in Roe "[was] far removed, both qualitatively and quantita-
tively, from that of the four- to eight-cell preembryos in this
case." 244 Thus, the court ruled that the trial court's treatment of the
preembryos as human beings was erroneous. 2 "
Furthermore, the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected the appellate
court's notion that the preembryos could be disposed of as if they
were property, primarily because the facts of York were inapposite
to the facts of Davis. In York, the parties had signed a "cry-
opreservation agreement" explicitly denoting the preembryos as
"property." '246 Since the Davises had not signed such a document,
the property argument was much less persuasive.247 The court found
that by relying on York, the appellate court had incorrectly con-
cluded that entities with the "potential" for human life were
property.248
Having found that preembryos do not deserve the respect ac-
corded to human beings, and having decided that they were not
property because of their "potential" for life, the supreme court
adopted the AFS Ethics Committee's Special Respect approach. 24 9
The court also adopted AFS guidelines relating to decision-making
authority over preembryos.0 ° Ultimately, the court believed that the
241. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594.
242. Id. at 594-95.
243. See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text (explaining the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of the legal status of fetuses).
244. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595.
245. Id.
246. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text (discussing the cryopreservation agree-
ment signed by the parties in York).
247. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 597; see supra notes 122-31, 197-98 and accompanying text (discussing the Special
Respect view of preembryos and the AFS's adoption of such an approach).
250. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597 ("Within the limits set by institutional policies, decision-making
authority regarding preembryos should reside with the persons who have provided the gametes.
A person's liberty to procreate or to avoid procreation is directly involved in most decisions
involving preembryos.") (quoting Ethics Comm. of the Am. Fertility Soc'y, Ethical Considera-
tions of the New Reproductive Technologies: The Moral and Legal Status of the Preembryo, 53
FERTILITY & STERILITY 34S, 36S (Supp. 11 1990)).
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Davises should control any decisions pertaining to their preembryos.
The court of appeals had resolved the issue by granting the couple
"joint" control,2 51 but the supreme court pointed out that joint con-
trol merely delineated the rights of the couple and cured their im-
passe by way of default. 62 A deadlock in this situation had the ef-
fect of granting Junior "veto" power over Mary Sue's wishes,
because the two-year limit on cryopreservation would cause the
preembryos to decompose.253 In effect, the supreme court viewed the
court of appeals' decision as a ruling in favor of Junior, although the
appellate court had offered no justifications for its actions.26 4 Fur-
thermore, the court found the appellate court's terminology ex-
tremely ironic; "joint custody" contradicted the actual effect of the
appellate court's holding, which allowed Junior an inherent veto
power. 256 For these reasons, the Tennessee Supreme Court found the
court of appeals opinion to be fatally flawed.
To the supreme court, the "essential dispute [was] ...not where
or how or how long to store the preembryos, but whether the parties
will become parents. 2 6  The answer to this question turned on the
couple's exercise of their constitutional right of privacy.26 7 The court
believed that liberty played the same role in the Tennessee Constitu-
tion as it did in the federal Constitution; 58 however, "there [was]
no reason to assume that there [was] a complete congruency. "259
The Tennessee Supreme Court reasoned that because the United
States Supreme Court had not yet addressed the issue of procreation
in the IVF context, the right of privacy in such cases had to be
251. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990).
252. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.; see supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text (discussing the right of privacy).
258. For example, Article 1, § 8 of the Tennessee State Constitution provides "[tihat no man
shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges ...or in any
manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers
. .. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 599 (citing TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8). Furthermore, Tennessee
grants its citizens the right to abolish their government and resist the arbitrary exercise of power.
Id. at 599-600 (citing TENN. CONST. art. I, §§ 1-2). Section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution
allows freedom of worship; § 7 permits the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures; § 19 grants freedom of speech and the press; and § 27 regulates the quartering of
soldiers. Id.; cf. supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the penumbra of rights sur-
rounding the Bill of Rights and the resulting right of privacy).
259. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 600.
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extended by the states. 6 ' The court found that in Tennessee the
right of procreation was "composed of two rights of equal signifi-
cance - the right to procreate and the right to avoid procrea-
tion.12 61 As a result, the court concluded that Junior and Mary Sue
were "entirely equivalent gamete-providers. '"262
Unlike in the abortion context,263 a woman's procreational rights
cannot outweigh those of the man where IVF is involved because no
concerns about a woman's bodily integrity are at issue.264 Therefore,
the Tennessee Supreme Court balanced the equivalent procreational
rights of the gamete-providers to determine the outcome of the
case. 269 Finding no state interest compelling enough to justify in-
fringement on the procreational autonomy of the parties,266 the
court determined that Junior Davis's procreational rights out-
weighed those of Mary Sue, stating:
Any disposition which results in the gestation of the preembryos would im-
pose unwanted parenthood on him, with all of its possible financial and psy-
chological consequences. . . . Donation, if a child came of it, would rob him
twice - his procreational autonomy would be defeated and his relationship
with his offspring would be prohibited."67
Conversely, "Refusal to permit donation of the preembryos would
impose on [Mary Sue] the burden of knowing that the lengthy IVF
procedures she underwent were futile, and that the preembryos to
which she contributed genetic material would never become chil-
dren." 6 The supreme court concluded that this interest was not as
significant as Junior's interests. 2 9 Therefore, the court allowed the
Knoxville Fertility Clinic to follow its normal procedures in dealing
with unused preembryos; presumably, the preembryos would be al-
lowed to expire in storage.270
The Tennessee Supreme Court, however, added one caveat to its
260. Id. at 601.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text (discussing the Danforth decision and the
Court's reasoning that because a woman's bodily integrity is at issue when abortion is considered,
the woman's procreational rights must outweigh the man's).
264. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601.
265. Id. at 603-05.
266. Id. at 602.
267. Id. at 603-04.
268. Id. at 604.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 604-05.
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holding: "The case would be closer if Mary Sue Davis were seeking
to use the preembryos herself, but only if she could not achieve
parenthood by any other reasonable means. "271 The court appeared
to imply that in this instance, Mary Sue's fundamental right to pro-
create would outweigh Junior's right not to procreate. However, be-
cause the facts of the Davis case differed from the scenario envi-
sioned by this exception, the Tennessee Supreme Court left this
issue unresolved.
III. ANALYSIS
In February, 1993, the United States Supreme Court denied
without comment Mary Sue Davis's request for a writ of certiorari
to review her case.272 Accordingly, the Tennessee Supreme Court
opinion remains the most detailed discussion of the complicated con-
stitutional issues that arise in the context of in vitro fertilization and
cryopreservation. Precisely because Davis v. Davis raises these intri-
cate issues relating to the rights of privacy and procreation, a care-
ful analysis is necessary to determine if the decision is constitution-
ally accurate and in accordance with good public policy.
A. The Tennessee Supreme Court's Adoption of the Special
Respect View
The Tennessee Supreme Court rejected both the opinions of the
trial court and court of appeals by granting the Davises' seven cry-
ogenically-preserved preembryos "special respect. '"273 This model
has the effect of placing preembryos on a continuum between per-
sons and property, 74 and is indeed proper. First, according to con-
stitutional precedent, preembryos do not deserve the legal rights of
persons.275 Furthermore, a preembryo cannot physically achieve the
status of a "person. ' 276 By the same token, preembryos are not via-
271. Id. at 604.
272. Stowe v. Davis, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993). When Mary Sue Davis remarried, she took her
new husband's name and became Mary Sue Stowe.
273. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597; see supra note 249 and accompanying text (noting the Tennes-
see Supreme Court's adoption of the Special Respect model).
274. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. This is the model adhered to by the American Fertility Society.
See supra notes 122-31 and accompanying text (describing the Special Respect view with regard
to the legal status of preembryos).
275. See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's view that
preembryos do not qualify as persons within the meaning of the 14th Amendment); see also infra
notes 279-80 and accompanying text (confirming the constitutional view of preembryos).
276. See infra notes 281-84 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why preembryos should
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ble.2 " For these reasons, the Tennessee Supreme Court's rejection
of the trial court's position that preembryos are persons was correct.
The court was also correct in declining to adopt the court of ap-
peals' decision to treat preembryos as property. This model does not
account for the genetic uniqueness of preembryos, their potential to
develop into a fetus and then a newborn, 278 and their symbolic
meaning for the gamete-donors. Because the Special Respect model
takes these factors into account without granting preembryos status
equal to that accorded living persons, it is the correct view of preem-
bryo status.
The Special Respect model is also attractive for several other rea-
sons. It is carefully limited to ensure that any respect granted
preembryos does not become superior to that of the gamete-donors
who created them. In addition, the model is credible and in accor-
dance with good public policy. For these reasons, the Tennessee Su-
preme Court's adoption of this paradigm was appropriate.
1. Preembryos Are Not Persons
a. Constitutional Definition of "Person"
According to current constitutional jurisprudence, the Tennessee
Supreme Court logically concluded that the Davises' preembryos de-
served "special respect," but not the full rights usually accorded to
"persons." The Supreme Court held in Roe that the word "person,"
as used in the Constitution, does not include the unborn.2 79 This
particular portion of the Roe holding has never been discredited.
Rather, the Court specifically reaffirmed this issue in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.280 Because
four- to eight-celled preembryos are obviously unborn, they are not
"persons" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Consti-
tution does not protect the seven frozen preembryos in the Davis
case in the same manner as it does persons. Therefore, the Special
Respect model adopted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis v.
not be accorded the same range of rights as persons).
277. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text (defining viability and noting the Supreme
Court's use and interpretation of viability in creating the Roe trimester framework); see also infra
notes 285-88 and accompanying text (discussing the nonviability of preembryos).
278. Robertson, Legal Status of Early Embryos, supra note 27, at 446-47.
279. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973); see supra notes 114-121 and accompanying text
(discussing the constitutional definition of the word "person").
280. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992).
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Davis is in accordance with constitutional precedent.
b. Preembryos Do Not Physically Amount to Persons
The concept of constitutional "personhood" would be affronted if
preembryos were granted the rights of persons because of the funda-
mental physical differences between "persons" and preembryos. A
cryogenically-preserved entity lacks "the ability to interact, be con-
scious, have experiences, or be sentient28' - the usual attributes of
persons or rights-bearing entities."2 82 A preembryo has not devel-
oped the physical structures of personhood, and is not developmen-
tally individual.283 Conceptually, it is therefore difficult to view these
four- to eight-celled organisms on the same level as viable fetuses,
infants, or adult human beings.284 Because preembryos are so rudi-
mentary, they cannot and should not be treated as "persons." Con-
sequently, the Tennessee Supreme Court's refusal to treat preem-
bryos as persons is acceptable due to the vastly different physical
composition of preembryos.
c. Preembryos Are Not Viable
Under federal constitutional law and the laws of the state of Ten-
nessee, in order to be granted the rights of a "person," an unborn
entity must be viable.28 5 A preembryo is not viable 286 because it is
dependent on cryopreservation and, ultimately, transfer to a uterus
for its survival. A preembryo approaches viability only after it is
transferred to a woman's uterus and given a chance to become im-
planted. If the preembryo does implant and develop for approxi-
mately twenty-two weeks, it might then have the ability to survive
outside of the mother's womb with the help of life support and other
modern technology. At that point, however, the preembryo has de-
veloped into a viable fetus. Prior to this stage, a preembryo clearly
cannot be termed a viable being.
The Right-to-Life view argues that cryogenically-preserved
281. "Sentience" is defined as the ability to feel or have sensation. DORLAND'S, supra note 25,
at 1507.
282. Robertson, Legal Status of Early Embryos, supra note 27, at 444-45.
283. Robertson, Legal Structure of New Reproduction, supra note 29, at 972.
284. Joseph J. Saltarelli, Genesis Retold: Legal Issues Raised by the Cryopreservation of
Preimplantation Human Embryos, 36 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1021, 1036-37 n.95 (1985).
285. See supra notes 83-98, 222-25 and accompanying text (discussing the Roe standard of
personhood and the Tennessee statutes that protect only fetuses which are "born alive").
286. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (defining the term "viability").
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preembryos do, in fact, satisfy the definition of viability. The Right-
to-Life stance views a preembryo as able to "survive" outside the
womb, albeit in a cryogenically-preserved state. However, there are
many differences between the viability of a fetus and a cryogeni-
cally-preserved preembryo. First, inherent in the concept of viability
is the notion that a being will no longer be physically dependent on
another for its existence. Unlike a viable fetus that does not need its
mother's body in order to survive, there is no possibility that a fro-
zen embryo will ever be able to "survive" without being transferred
to a woman's body. A frozen preembryo has no hope for indepen-
dent existence without first becoming dependent on another human
being; therefore, it is not viable.
Second, a viable fetus will, under the best of circumstances, be
able to grow and develop into a healthy infant, and later an adult.
By contrast, the growth of a cryogenically-preserved preembryo is
forever stalled at the four- to eight-cell stage; a preembryo does not
even possess the potential for further cell division without implanta-
tion in a uterus. This lack of potential does not accord with the com-
mon notion of "viability. '28 7
Ultimately, one cannot consider a preembryo viable because too
many contingencies might arise before an implanted embryo reaches
twenty-two to twenty-eight weeks. From the time a man donates his
sperm and a woman's ovum is aspirated to the time a fertilized
preembryo is transferred to a woman's uterus, chances are very slim
that a human fetus will develop successfully.2 8 Many preembryos
expire of their own accord in the lab or while frozen, and many
never become implanted once they are transferred to a uterus, as
they are expelled shortly after transfer. The notion that preembryos
are viable entities is contradicted by the facts and statistics of in
vitro fertilization. Therefore, preembryos cannot be treated in the
same manner as persons, or even fetuses. Because the Special Re-
spect model recognizes these inherent differences, its adoption by
the Tennessee Supreme Court was proper.
287. Even if science were to develop an "artificial womb" that could bring a preembryo to term
without the aid of a human female, a preembryo preserved outside the artificial womb would still
not be viable. To be viable, it would have to develop to the appropriate age inside the womb. See
Saltarelli, supra note 284, at 1039 (discussing artificial womb technology and some hypothetical
situations).
288. See supra note 39 (discussing the odds of becoming pregnant and giving birth to a child
with the aid of IVF).
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2. Preembryos Are Not Property
If preembryos are not persons, it would seem that they could in-
stead be viewed as property. 89 However, the Tennessee Supreme
Court sensibly concluded that the property model is also inappropri-
ate to describe the legal status of preembryos, although the model
does contain certain advantages. One advantage of the property
model is that it creates a bright-line rule, which leads to fast, pre-
dictable results in court. Courts and legislatures have developed and
defined "marital property" law for centuries, and they could avoid
difficulties by applying similar rules of property law to reduce dis-
putes over frozen embryos.
However, this bright-line test created by the property model is
inappropriate in the context of disputes over frozen embryos. Frozen
embryos are fundamentally different from property because they
contain the genetic material of which human life is comprised. Ac-
cordingly, a court should evaluate each dispute on its merits to
weigh the delicate factors involved with such important subject mat-
ter. Furthermore, disputes involving preembryos necessarily impli-
cate constitutional issues of procreation and privacy. 9 ° Such issues
cannot be decided in a routine manner without considering the im-
portant rights at stake. In addition, using the property model's
bright-line test to resolve disputes over preembryos is impractical.
The appellate court's decision in the Davis case illustrates these im-
practicalities. By giving the Davises joint control of the preembryos,
the court of appeals effectively granted Junior Davis's wish to see
them destroyed,291 a result which is extremely inconsistent with the
notion of "joint control." Further, Mary Sue and Junior had "joint
control" over the embryos in the first place; they involved the Ten-
nessee courts because they themselves could not solve the differences
resulting from this joint control. The property model did not solve
this dispute because neither party's position was amenable to modifi-
cation. Mary Sue felt that destruction of one preembryo was mur-
der, and Junior felt that transfer of one preembryo violated his con-
289. See supra notes 132-45 and accompanying text (explaining the property model used to
classify the legal status of preembryos).
290. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text (discussing the procreational implications of
IVF and preembryos).
291. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub non. Stowe v. Davis,
113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993).
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stitutional rights. 92 "Joint control" certainly did not solve their
dilemma.
Not only is the property classification of preembryos impractical,
it is also senseless. One can see this irrationality by hypothesizing
the outcome of the appellate court decision in a community property
state. In a community property state, property acquired during mar-
riage is divided equally among divorcing spouses.2 93 Because the
Davises' seven preembryos were acquired during their marriage, in
such a state Mary Sue would receive three and one-half preembryos
while Junior would receive the other three and one-half preembryos.
Such a result would frustrate the individual desires of both of the
Davises. Clearly, treating frozen embryos as property is not the best
solution to the problem.
The preceding discussion illustrates the fundamental flaw of the
property analysis: it is indifferent to the fact that preembryos con-
tain the genetic material that comprises human life. Splitting the
number of preembryos down the middle is an offensive way of treat-
ing entities that possess the possibility of developing into fetuses.
Additionally, treating these preembryos as property could cause the
courts to embark on a "slippery slope." If preembryos possessing the
potential for human life are found to be personal property, a later
court using similar reasoning might conclude that perhaps a fetus,
or even a newborn, is personal property. 94 Furthermore, making
human life a commodity is prohibited by the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the Constitution. If preembryos are property,
the law comes dangerously close to entertaining the argument that
human beings can be bought and sold. Thus, the Tennessee Su-
preme Court's rejection of the property model of preembryos is con-
sistent with good public policy as well as the United States
Constitution.
292. See supra notes 177-92 and accompanying text (noting the couple's differing opinions re-
garding the preembryos and procreational autonomy).
293. E.g., CAL. FAMILY CODE § 2550 (West 1994) (stating the nammer of division for commu-
nity property).
294. Treating children as property is clearly contrary to the public policy of our nation. The use
of money in connection with adoption or even surrogacy services is strictly prohibited in all states.
See, e.g., In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (holding that the surrogate parent contract
at issue, which required that fees be paid to both the mother and the infertility center, was illegal
pursuant to state statutes prohibiting any relationship between adoption and the payment of
money).
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3. Limits of Special Respect
According to the foregoing analysis, the Tennessee Supreme
Court was correct in declining to grant the Davises' preembryos the
full rights of persons and in refusing to treat the preembryos as
mere property. However, by granting the preembryos "special re-
spect," the court implicitly granted the preembryos some degree of
reverence and consideration. This appreciation is acceptable in con-
stitutional terms because it does not exceed the appreciation the
court granted to the gamete-donors themselves. Subject to Roe's
"viability framework, ' 2 95 any "rights" possessed by non-viable
preembryos are subordinate to those of the gamete-donors who cre-
ated them. The Roe line of cases stands for the general proposition
that procreational decision-making is fundamental and the most in-
timate and private of rights.2 96 A state cannot interfere in a procrea-
tional decision without a "compelling" state interest.297 In Roe, the
Supreme Court asserted that there is no compelling state interest in
protecting the life of a fetus until it reaches the point of viability.298
Therefore, a woman's privacy interest in the decision of whether to
"bear or beget a child" is paramount during the first trimester of
pregnancy.2 99 Because the decision to implant or destroy these
multi-celled preembryos involves the decision of whether to "bear or
beget a child," it is a procreational decision. Thus, the Roe "viabil-
ity framework," as affirmed and modified in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, applies to cryogenically-pre-
served preembryos. Since the preembryos are not viable, there can
be no compelling state interest justifying interference with the deci-
sion of whether to implant or destroy the Davises' seven preem-
bryos. 30 0 Therefore, the Tennessee Supreme Court properly applied
the Special Respect model so that the Davises' right to choose
whether to implant or terminate the preembryos outweighed any
"special respect" accorded to the preembryos.
295. See supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text (discussing the Roe trimester framework).
296. See supra notes 82-106 (discussing the fundamental rights of privacy and procreation).
297. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text (discussing the point at which a state's
interest in preventing abortion becomes compelling).
298. See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text (discussing the Roe decision).
299. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); see supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text
(discussing the Roe viability framework).
300. See supra note 57 (explaining strict scrutiny).
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4. Credibility and Public Policy
One of the advantages of the Tennessee Supreme Court's adop-
tion of the Special Respect model is its popularity. The Special Re-
spect view is the majority position30' and most experts in the field
agree with this model.302 The fact that those individuals who are the
most knowledgeable about cryopreservation and its moral and legal
implications endorse this view lends strong support to its credibility.
Additionally, the Special Respect position is based on sound pol-
icy considerations. A society that grants no respect whatsoever to
genetic material with the potential for human life and which treats
preembryos as mere property might properly be considered barbaric.
Such a society seems inconsistent with modern notions of civiliza-
tion. Furthermore, on the verge of the twenty-first century, with sci-
ence and technology proceeding at their rapid pace, this society
should be particularly careful about its attitudes towards humanity
and the building-blocks of humanity, such as preembryos. Other-
wise, the predictions of authors such as George Orwell and Aldous
Huxley might just become reality.303
On the other hand, if preembryos are given the full range of
rights retained by human beings, society would still become unbear-
able. Preembryo implantation could become mandatory if preem-
bryos are considered "persons." And because it is doubtful that
there would be enough willing volunteers to implant all the preem-
bryos currently cryopreserved, "eligible" women might be forced to
participate against their will. Nothing could be more violative of
personal autonomy than being forced to bear another person's child
against one's will.
In addition, if preembryos are treated as human beings, other pre-
301. See supra text accompanying notes 122-131 and accompanying text (discussing the Spe-
cial Respect view of preembryos). This is evidenced by the fact that most state statutes regulating
fetal experimentation apply only to fetuses beyond the blastocyst stage. Lorio, supra note 23, at
1668 n.162.
302. See supra notes 122-131 and accompanying text (discussing the Special Respect view of
preembryos).
303. See ALDOus HUXLEY. BRAVE NEW WORLD (1931); GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949). In
his novel 1984. Orwell "created a futuristic society in which artificial insemination was used eu-
genically and in which coital reproduction was forbidden." Jean M. Eggen, The "Orwellian
Nightmare" Reconsidered: A Proposed Regulatory Framework For the Advanced Reproductive
Technologies, 25 GA. L. REV. 625, 627 n.1 (1991). In BRAVE NEW WORLD, Huxley depicted a
society where asexual human reproduction prevailed. David G. Dickman, Comment, Social Val-
ues in a Brave New World: Toward A Public Policy Regarding Embryo Status and In Vitro
Fertilization, 29 ST. Louis U. L.J. 817, 817 (1985).
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posterous situations might arise. For example, it would be plausible
to argue that preembryos could inherit from the estates of both their
biological and surrogate parents.30 4 Fights would ensue as to who
had the right to implant future heirs. The foregoing discussion, al-
though somewhat far-fetched, makes it obvious from a policy stand-
point that the Tennessee Supreme Court was wise in adopting the
Special Respect concept.
B. The Constitutionality of the Davis Decision
The Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Davis cre-
ates two interrelated lines of inquiry in the realm of constitutional-
ity: the court's holding that the right of privacy encompasses the
coextensive rights of procreation and avoiding procreation,30 5 and
the balancing test used by the court to determine which of those
rights should prevail on the facts of the Davis case.306 The Davis
court acted constitutionally by creating and applying such rules of
law. However, the prudence of some of the Davis court's more spe-
cific holdings remains questionable.
1. The Right to Procreate and the Right to Avoid Procreation
In granting Junior Davis's request to terminate the preembryos,
the Tennessee Supreme Court decided that the right of privacy en-
compasses the coextensive rights to procreate and to avoid procrea-
tion.307 While this finding expands traditional notions concerning the
right of privacy, it complies with constitutional precedent. By impli-
cation, the procreation and privacy decisions contain these two cate-
gorically opposite rights. While Skinnera° can be seen as the cham-
304. In fact, such a situation arose involving a Los Angeles couple who died in a plane crash,
leaving an estate of $1 million, no will, and two frozen embryos in Australia. Australians Reject
Bid to Destroy Two Embryos, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1984, at A18. The couple's estate was distrib-
uted to their intestate heirs according to California law, without regard to their cryogenically-
preserved preembryos. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 590 n.2. (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub
nom. Stowe v. Davis, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993).
305. See supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text (noting the Tennessee Supreme Court's
holding that the right of privacy extended to both the right to procreate and the right to avoid
procreation); see also infra notes 307-12 and accompanying text (discussing these coextensive
rights).
306. See supra notes 265-70 and accompanying text (explaining the balancing test the court
applied in deciding the case); see also infra notes 313-22 and accompanying text (discussing this
balancing test).
307. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601.
308. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see supra note 74 and accompanying text
(discussing the right to procreate inherent in the Skinner decision, which held that convicts have
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pion of one's right to reproduce, Griswold,30 9 Eisenstadt,3 10 and
Roe 1' can be seen as the champions of one's right not to reproduce.
Even if a person feels that these Supreme Court decisions do not
directly support the Davis court's holding, the Davis decision in no
way contradicts them. In constitutional jurisprudence, the federal
Constitution delineates a "floor" of constitutional rights possessed
by citizens. State courts and legislatures are free to create the "ceil-
ing" of those rights, as states are always free to grant their citizens
more rights than those mandated by the federal Constitution. 312
Consequently, by bestowing upon Tennessee citizens the "right to
avoid procreation" as well as the right to procreate, the Tennessee
Supreme Court acted within its available powers.
2. The Davis Balancing Test and its Exception
The Davis court balanced the interests of the gamete-donors in
deciding who possessed the right to control the fate of the seven
frozen preembryos. This methodology is consistent with previous
constitutional precedent. Also, based on the circumstances of the
case, the Davis court's finding that the balance tipped in favor of
Junior Davis is proper. However, in dicta, the court created an ex-
ception to the balancing test to be used when different factual condi-
tions present themselves. This exception dangerously impairs the
holding of the Davis case. Therefore, future courts should regard
this exception as exactly what it is: mere, nonbinding dicta.
the right not to be forcibly sterilized by the state).
309. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see supra note 76-81 and accompanying
text (discussing the right of privacy inherent in the Griswold holding that the state cannot prevent
married couples from using birth control).
310. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); see supra note 77-81 and accompanying text
(discussing Eisenstadt's extension of Griswold to nonmarried couples).
311. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (discussing the rights
of privacy and procreation inherent in the Roe Court's decision that a woman may not be prohib-
ited from obtaining an abortion in the first trimester).
312. The Supreme Court has held that:
Within our federal system the substantive rights provided by the Federal Constitution
define only a minimum. State law may recognize liberty interests more extensive than
those independently protected by the Federal Constitution. . . . Moreover, a state
may confer procedural protections of liberty interests that extend beyond those mini-
mally required by the Constitution of the United States.
Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982) (citing Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442
U.S. I, 7, 12 (1979); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975)).
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a. Consistency With Danforth
The balancing test created by the Davis court is constitutional in
that it is consistent with previous Supreme Court precedent. Specifi-
cally, Davis is in accordance with the decision in Planned
Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth,3 13 the Supreme Court's pri-
mary statement of decisional rights in the context of reproduction.
In Danforth, the Supreme Court held that a woman's right to termi-
nate her pregnancy prevails over the decisional interests of the fe-
tus's "father" because only the woman's bodily autonomy is impli-
cated. 14 By contrast, the balancing test created by the court in
Davis evaluates both sexes as "entirely equivalent gamete-provid-
ers." '315 This statement is acceptable under Danforth, because no is-
sue of bodily integrity arises in the context of in vitro fertilization." 6
Cryogenically-preserved preembryos are located outside a woman's
womb. Consequently, no reason exists for a male gamete-donor's de-
cision to be discounted in disputes over frozen embryos. Thus, the
balancing test the Tennessee Supreme Court created in Davis does
not contradict Danforth, and is therefore constitutional.
b. Balancing the Parties' Interests
Once the Tennessee Supreme Court decided that Mary Sue and
Junior Davis possessed equivalent rights in their preembryos, it was
confronted with resolving the deadlock over the preembryos' disposi-
tion. The court was faced with an all or nothing decision: if Mary
Sue prevailed, all of the preembryos had to be implanted; but if
Junior prevailed, none of the preembryos could be implanted. Fur-
thermore, deciding in favor of one party meant violating a funda-
mental right of the other party: for Mary Sue the right to procreate,
and for Junior the right to avoid procreation. The Davis court bal-
anced the interests of the parties and found that a disposition in
favor of Junior was less violative of his fundamental rights than
would be a disposition in favor of Mary Sue. 1 7 Therefore, the court
tipped the balance in favor of Junior. 1 8 This conclusion was com-
313. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
314. Id. at 69, 71.
315. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 599, 601 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub norn. Stowe v. Davis,
113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993).
316. Ahnen, supra note 110, at 1299.
317. Davis. 842 S.W.2d at 604.
318. Id.
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pelled by the facts of the Davis case and as such was fair and
equitable.
The court held that allowing Mary Sue to donate the preembryos
would cause Junior to suffer irreparable harm.3 19 Once a child is
born, there is no way to end biological ties, and very few ways to
end emotional ones. Junior's right to avoid procreation would have
been irreparably damaged had the court found in favor of Mary
Sue. Additionally, Junior would have faced a lifetime of unwanted
fatherhood and its accompanying psychological burdens.
On the other hand, the court noted that a ruling in favor of Jun-
ior, thus allowing the preembryos to expire in storage, would not
cause irreparable damage to Mary Sue.3" Mary Sue's desire to pro-
duce a biologically-related child would merely be delayed by a deci-
sion in favor of Junior, not completely destroyed. Mary Sue was not
denied the right to procreate; procreation could still be accom-
plished, just not with these particular preembryos.
Furthermore, the specific facts of the Davis case clearly indicated
a disposition in favor of Junior because Junior's fundamental right
not to procreate was more severely implicated than Mary Sue's
right to procreate. Mary Sue did not ask the court's permission to
implant the preembryos in her own body. Her ultimate objective
was authorization to donate the preembryos to another woman for
implantation. 2' Introducing one's genetic material into the world is
obviously procreation, but at its most basic level. The right to pro-
create seems to encompass more rights than just an instinct to per-
petuate the human race. As an outgrowth of the right of privacy,
the right to procreate can be seen as one means of protecting the
liberty to create family relationships and raise one's children as one
sees fit.3 22 By aspiring only to donate the preembryos, Mary Sue was
not demanding that such rights be given effect. By contrast, Junior
was demanding that his right to avoid procreation be given full force
and effect. Junior did not want to introduce his genetic material into
the world in combination with that of Mary Sue; he no longer
wanted a child, or even a family relationship, with her. Accordingly,
319. As Professor Robertson points out, "The party who wishes to avoid offspring is irreversibly
harmed if embryo transfer and birth occur, for the burdens of unwanted parenthood cannot then
be avoided." Robertson, Legal Status of Early Embryos, supra note 27, at 480.
320. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
321. Id.
322. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the penumbra of rights related to
the right of privacy).
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if Mary Sue was allowed to donate the preembryos, the impact on
Junior's rights would have been greater than the impact on Mary
Sue's if the preembryos were permitted to expire in storage. There-
fore, the Tennessee Supreme Court was correct in holding that Jun-
ior's right to avoid procreation outweighed Mary Sue's right to
procreate.
c. The Exception to the Rule
The Davis decision creates a rule of law whereby, when faced
with the donation or termination of cryogenically-preserved preem-
bryos, the court balances the competing rights of the gamete-donors
to procreate and avoid procreation. As discussed in the preceding
section, one of the elements presumably underlying the Davis
court's balancing is whether or not the gamete-donor will use the
preembryos herself or donate them to another person. In fact, the
court went so far as to hint that when a gamete-donor did desire to
implant the preembryos, the balancing test would tip in her favor:
"The case would be closer if Mary Sue Davis were seeking to use
the preembryos herself, but only if she could not achieve parenthood
by any other reasonable means." ' The effect of this statement is to
create an exception to the Davis court's main holding, an exception
which is defective for several reasons.
The primary flaw of this statement is that it contradicts the pre-
ceding portions of the Davis opinion. The court claimed to create a
balancing test to resolve disputes over frozen embryos. By their na-
ture, balancing tests consider and weigh different factors before a
final decision is reached. By allowing one factor, such as whether or
not the preembryos will be used by a gamete-donor, to weigh so
heavily in the balance, an exception to the balancing test itself is
created. The effectiveness and credibility of the balancing test are
therefore undermined. What begins as an objective means of deter-
mining the rights of feuding gamete-donors ends up as a subjective
way of favoring one party over another.
Secondly, the exception contradicts the Davis court's attempt to
create a gender-neutral rule of law for disputes arising between IVF
participants. On the one hand, the Davis, court stated that in the
context of IVF, men and women are to be seen as "entirely
323. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
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equivalent gamete-providers.13 2 On the other hand, the exception
works to favor female gamete-donors over male. To illustrate, imag-
ine a dispute arising over frozen embryos where the female gamete-
donor desires preembryo expiration. The male gamete-donor, how-
ever, asks the court to allow his new wife, or a surrogate volunteer,
to implant the preembryos. Taken literally, the Davis court's excep-
tion would not apply to the man because he can not use the preem-
bryos himself, i.e., implant them in his own body. Furthermore, IVF
is usually used by couples where the woman has trouble becoming
pregnant. Therefore, in the majority of situations, the male gamete-
donor has other means of reproduction available. Accordingly,
under the Davis court's reasoning, a male gamete-donor's request to
implant the preembryos would probably be denied.
The final effect of the balancing test and its exception is to give
female gamete-donors veto power over male gamete-donors. Mary
Sue Davis's position is probably rare in that many gamete-donors
will not want to merely donate preembryos, but will want to implant
them themselves. Thus, in many cases, the Davis opinion will cause
a female gamete-donor's decision to control the fate of frozen em-
bryos: when a female gamete-donor desires to implant the preem-
bryos in her own body, her wishes prevail, but when a male gamete-
donor wants the preembryos implanted, the female's wishes still pre-
vail. Such veto power is completely at odds with Danforth's325 strict
prohibition on granting vetoes concerning procreational rights to
parties whose bodily interests are not implicated. 26 As such, the
Davis decision subtly undermines the Supreme Court's holding in
Danforth. The danger in the realm of procreational freedom is ap-
parent: allowing veto power in such a manner causes one to question
the entire premise upon which procreational freedom in the United
States is based, that no person or entity may interfere with one's
decision of whether or not to bear a child before the point of
viability.
The foregoing analysis shows that the major error of Davis v. Da-
vis is the exception that the court created to its balancing test. The
exception "swallows up the rule" and risks reducing the test to a
cursory inquiry into a female gamete donor's fertility and plans for
324. Id. at 601.
325. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
326. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale in Danforth sup-
porting a prohibition of vetoes concerning procreational rights).
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the preembryos' future.
3. Summary
From this discussion, it is evident that the ultimate flaw in the
Tennessee Supreme Court's opinion is its lack of consistency. Al-
though the court found the proper classification for the preembryos
by granting them "special respect," and correctly balanced the
Davises' procreational rights in upholding Junior Davis's right not to
procreate, the court's dicta concerning the exception to its main
holding potentially contradicts the main holding itself. Future courts
should avoid such inconsistencies and strive for more clarity in the
area of in vitro fertilization.
IV. IMPACT
The Davis decision has the potential to affect many lives. Ten
million out of sixty-seven million reproductively-active couples in
the United States, are infertile,32 and in vitro fertilization is cur-
rently used once a day in the United States. 28 Davis v. Davis329 is
the only case of its kind in that it discusses the disposition of cry-
ogenically-preserved preembryos when gamete-providers have not
signed a prior dispositional agreement.330 Without a doubt, the Da-
vis case will be looked to for guidance should future disputes involv-
ing in vitro fertilization and frozen embryos arise. Thus, one must
explore the impact of Davis in detail, paying specific attention to the
adoption of the Special Respect view. Furthermore, the procrea-
tional and privacy issues decided in Davis are of fundamental im-
port. How the Davis case affects current constitutional precedent in
these areas is an issue of great consequence. Finally, an investiga-
tion of the effect of the court-created exception to the Davis holding
is necessary to elucidate its flaws and understand its limitations.
A. Impact of the "Special Respect" View
Among the many significant holdings of Davis v. Davis is the
Tennessee Supreme Court's finding that the Davises' cryogenically-
327. Davis, supra note 21, at 510 n.22.
328. Id. at 511.
329. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Stowe v. Davis, 113 S. Ct. 1259
(1993).
330. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (discussing the use of cryopreservation
agreements by fertility clinics).
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preserved preembryos deserve "special respect." '' Adoption of the
Special Respect view has possible implications in several areas be-
cause of the ambiguity inherent in the term "special respect." "Spe-
cial respect" is not clearly defined in either the AFS guidelines or in
the Davis decision. Future courts and policy-makers are left to won-
der how this view of preembryo status affects areas such as abortion
and birth control.
1. Special Respect and Abortion
The Tennessee Supreme Court's adoption of the Special Respect
view complicates issues in the area of abortion. Despite the Davis
court's strong procreational rights stance, future courts may misread
the opinion to find that it contradicts Roe v. Wade.332 One could
interpret "special respect" as granting preembryos, which are not
"persons" in constitutional terms, more deference than non-viable
fetuses. Granting preembryos "special respect" might cause the
court to embark on a "slippery slope" where preembryos and other
nonviable entities consisting of human genetic material are gradu-
ally treated like viable fetuses until they acquire the same range of
rights as human beings. In this manner, "special respect" could one
day trump the rights of the gamete-donors who created the
preembryos.
However, the likelihood that a court will protect preembryos more
than a viable or non-viable fetus, and succeed in doing so, is proba-
bly dependent upon the political composition of the United States
Supreme Court. And, despite what seemed to this author to be a
rampantly conservative Supreme Court during the 1980s and early
1990s, the Court in 1992 reaffirmed the principles upon which Roe
v. Wade was based.333 Accordingly, any perceived alteration of the
Roe holding resulting from the Tennessee Supreme Court's adoption
of the Special Respect view is unlikely.
An additional impact of the Special Respect view on abortion
rights might occur with respect to pregnant women who wish to ter-
minate their pregnancy. If the Special Respect view were to become
331. Id. at 597.
332. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
333. See supra note I 18 and accompanying text (discussing the Casey decision's affirmation of
Roe v. Wade). Furthermore, with the advent of a democratic presidential administration and the
recent appointment of Ruth Bader Ginsberg to the Supreme Court, it appears even more likely
that the principles of Roe will continue to be upheld.
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widely promulgated, pregnant women might feel as if they were act-
ing in contravention of the "special respect" their fetus deserved if
they chose abortion over childbirth. However, most women who de-
cide to terminate their pregnancy already face a similar dilemma in
that they are confronted by the Right-to-Life position, which es-
pouses that "life begins at the moment of conception." 33 Further-
more, some women might see "special respect" as consistent with
pro-choice principles in that it does not accord preembryos the
rights typically accorded to "persons." Hence, the Tennessee Su-
preme Court's adoption of the Special Respect view will not have a
striking impact on women deciding whether or not to terminate a
pregnancy; if anything, the Special Respect view merely helps to
reaffirm a woman's preconceived opinion on abortion.
2. Special Respect and Birth Control
The ambiguity of the term "special respect" could impact the use
of certain types of birth control. For example, some methods of
birth control, particularly intra-uterine devices, terminate pregnancy
at approximately the same stage of development at which cryogeni-
cally-preserved preembryos are arrested. 35 Perhaps the multi-celled
entities destroyed by IUDs also deserve "special respect," and there-
fore it logically follows that IUDs should not be utilized. However,
such an argument ignores the fact that the Tennessee Supreme
Court specifically held that cryopreserved entities, although deserv-
ing of "special respect," can be destroyed at the option of the gam-
ete-donors who created them. Thus, the Tennessee Supreme Court's
adoption of the Special Respect model in Davis should not affect the
use or legality of intra-uterine devices.
B. The Procreational Rights Impact of Davis
The Tennessee Supreme Court's determination that Mary Sue
and Junior Davis held equivalent rights to procreate and avoid pro-
creation necessarily impacts on the way Tennessee courts will inter-
pret the Supreme Court's privacy and procreation decisions in the
future.33 Because the Davis case reaffirms, strengthens, and ex-
334. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text (discussing the Right-to-Life view).
335. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing the legality of intra uterine
devices).
336. See supra notes 57-81 and accompanying text (discussing the right of privacy and the
right of procreation).
1994]
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
pands upon decisions such as Griswold v. Connecticut,337 Eisenstadt
v. Baird,338 and Roe v. Wade,a1 9 Tennessee citizens can be assured
that their state courts will protect the rights of privacy and procrea-
tion. This impact of Davis is especially noteworthy because several
members of the United States Supreme Court and Right-to-Life ac-
tivists have criticized Roe and its progeny.340
C. Impact of the Davis Court's Exception
The primary conclusion of the Davis court is that, in the context
of in vitro fertilization, gamete-donors are "entirely equivalent."""1
Thus, the court creates a balancing test to determine the rights of
such parties. However, the court went on to state that one factor
weighs very heavily in the equation: that is, when a gamete-donor
desires to implant the preembryos in her own body, her wishes
should prevail.""2 In effect, this statement creates an exception to
the court's main holding. Ultimately, this exception favors female
gamete-donors over male gamete-donors. 34 3 The possible impact of
this rule of law is monumental because it contains the potential to
threaten the balance of power among men and women in the area of
procreational rights.
Currently, the law is absolutely clear: In the context of abortion
and pregnancy, men and women stand on equal footing. It is due to
337. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
338. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
339. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
340. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2875 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Roe and its progeny were not decided through "reasoned
judgment"); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstets. & Gynecs., 476 U.S. 747, 787 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting) (criticizing Roe as departing from a proper understanding of the Constitu-
tion); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453-59 (1983) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the Roe framework as an "unworkable method of accomodating the
conflicting personal views and compelling state interests that are involved in the abortion con-
text"); see also Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 381 (1985) (criticizing Roe as venturing too far in the change
it ordered). For an extensive, though by no means exhaustive, list of academic criticism of Roe
and its progeny, see Thomas L. Jipping, Informed Consent to Abortion: A Refinement, 38 CASE
W. REs. L. REV. 329, 332 n.15 (1988).
341. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Stowe v. Davis,
113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993); see supra notes 261-70 and accompanying text (discussing the Davis
opinion and its holding that gamete-donors are equal).
342. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
343. See supra notes 323-26 and accompanying text (analyzing the Davis opinion and deter-
mining that the court manufactured an exception to its own rule that ultimately favors female
gamete-donors over male donors).
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bodily autonomy and not gender that women control pregnancy de-
cisions. Danforth held that when procreational decisions have to be
made, and when one party's bodily interests are implicated, that
party's unilateral choice is decisive since that party is more directly
and immediately affected.3' 4 However, after Davis, even though no
bodily interests are concerned, the court's exception tips the balance
in favor of women. The imminent danger is that by favoring women
in this area, men are discriminated against. One could use such a
precedent to discriminate on the basis of sex in other areas as well.
For example, Davis might be used to favor men in the context of
sperm donation or artificial insemination. A better rule of law would
take into account all interests of the parties involved in a reproduc-
tive dispute, and not base decisions upon gender alone.
For these reasons, future courts should minimize the importance
of the aforementioned exception when deciding issues concerning
frozen embryos. Since the specific issue addressed by the exception
was not before the court in Davis,"4 5 it is mere dicta. Future courts
should take the interests of both of the gamete-donors into account
during the balancing process and not place any undue emphasis
upon their gender. Only in this way will the courts avoid the dan-
gers inherent in the exception.
D. Impact of Davis on IVF Participants
The Davis decision lends some certainty to those couples who
enter in vitro fertilization clinics and decide to have excess preem-
bryos cryopreserved for future use. If they have not signed a cry-
opreservation agreement, these couples can be relatively sure that
the party wishing to dispose of the preembryos will control, unless
the female gamete-donor has no additional means of reproducing
biologically related offspring and intends to implant the preembryos
in her own body.34 Ultimately, the result of the Davis decision in
these situations is a speedier resolution for disputes involving frozen
embryos.
However, litigation is still necessary when a male gamete-donor
344. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text (examining Danforth, which held that a
pregnant woman's bodily interests trump a man's ability to participate in the decision-making
process with regard to the pregnancy).
345. Mary Sue Davis wanted to donate the preembryos, not implant them herself. Davis, 842
S.w.2d at 604.
346. See supra notes 313-26 and accompanying text (analyzing the general rule and the excep-
tion created by the Davis court).
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wishes to see the preembryos implanted over the female gamete-do-
nor's wishes. A man in this situation cannot be certain of the out-
come of a dispute."4 7 The exception created by the Davis court pro-
vokes this uncertainty. Thus, certainty concerning the outcome of
disputes involving frozen embryos is limited.
Because the Davis decision does not adequately resolve every is-
sue that might arise between parties disputing the disposition of fro-
zen embryos, and because litigation over frozen embryos is expen-
sive, time-consuming, and emotionally wrenching, the best solution
to problems concerning preembryos is to address those problems
before they arise. In vitro fertilization clinics should require couples
being treated for infertility to sign cryopreservation agreements
before treatment begins. Such prior directives present "the best way
to maximize the couple's reproductive freedom, to give advance cer-
tainty to couples and IVF programs, and to minimize disputes and
their costs."3 48 In the Davises' situation, the dispute over their seven
cryogenically-preserved preembryos caused great emotional pain
and turmoil. Had the Davises been required to sign an advance di-
rective, they would have avoided these problems. But perhaps the
greatest impact of this case is in the lesson to be learned by those
offering IVF services and undergoing IVF treatment: couples must
fully disclose their desires concerning the disposal of their preem-
bryos by signing cryopreservation agreements before preembryos are
created and stored for future use.
CONCLUSION
The Tennessee Supreme Court had a difficult task at hand in at-
tempting to resolve the issues raised by Davis v. Davis.49 The court
succeeded in complying with current constitutional precedent, and
managed to expand the rights of Tennessee citizens in the pro-
cess.3850 Therefore, one cannot criticize the court for overreaching
into the realm of the legislature nor for allowing abbreviation of the
constitutional rights of procreation or privacy.351 Even though the
347. See supra notes 313-26 and accompanying text (discussing the inconsistencies between the
general rule developed by the Davis court and the exception to that rule).
348. Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 28, at 414.
349. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Stowe v. Davis, 113 S. Ct. 1259
(1993).
350. See supra notes 256-62 and accompanying text (discussing the Tennessee Supreme
Court's expansion of existing constitutional precedent).
351. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (describing these criticisms of judicial activ-
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rule the Davis court created is a triumph for procreational free-
dom,352 the court diminished that triumph by creating an exception
that effectively negates the very same rule.3 53 The court's lack of
consistency is a major flaw which will not likely stand the test of
time. Future courts faced with disputes involving cryogenically-pre-
served preembryos would be wise to adopt the general rule of Davis
v. Davis and ignore its inconsistent exception.
Jennifer L. Carow
ism and nonintervention).
352. See supra notes 256-62 and accompanying text (describing the Tennessee Supreme
Court's expansion of the right of procreation).
353. See supra notes 312-26 and accompanying text (discussing the inconsistencies between the
general rule developed by the Davis court and the exception to that rule).
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